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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARY C. BARTLETT, : 
Plaintiff-Appellant : Category 14(b) 
vs. : 
WILLIAM P. TROSS, : Case No. 880454-CA 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this 
domestic relations matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-
2a-3(2)(g). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from a final Order Modifying A Decree of 
the Fourth Judicial District Court, Judge Boyd L. Park 
presiding, in which the lower court modified a Decree of 
Dissolution and Separation Agreement entered by the Common 
Pleas Court of Green County, Ohio, Division of Domestic 
Relations, in regard to the sale of the marital residence, 
visitation, medical insurance on the minor children, and 
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federal and state tax exemptions. The Court also entered a 
restraining order forbidding the parties from taping telephone 
conversations, or otherwise bothering or harassing the other 
party. It is from the court's award of the federal and state 
tax exemptions for the minor to defendant-respondent, the 
noncustodial parent, from which plaintiff-appellant!s seeks 
relief. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Did the trial court err in failing to imply into 
the Decree of Divorce the rules promulgated by the Internal 
Revenue Service pursuant to the terms of the Dissolution 
Decree? 
II. Did the trial court err in failing to find a 
material change of circumstances prior to modifying the Decree 
of Dissolution regarding federal and state income tax 
exemptions? 
III. Did the trial court award the federal and state 
income tax exemptions for the minor children to the defendant-
respondent in violation of federal law? 
IV. Was the award of the federal and state income tax 
exemptions for the minor children to defendant-respondent an 
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
FEDERAL STATUTES AND STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, §30-3-5(3): 
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
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subsequent changes or new orders for the support and 
maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and 
dental care, or the distribution of the property as 
is reasonable and necessary. 
United States Constitution. Article IV, Clause 2: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all 
Treaties made, of which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution of 
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
26 U.S.C. 152 (e) 
1) Custodial parent gets exemption.—Except as 
otherwise provided in this subsection, if— 
A) a child (as defined in section 151(c)(3)) 
receives over half of his support during the 
calendar year from his parents— 
i) who are divorced or legally separated 
under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance, 
ii) who are separated under a written 
separation agreement, or 
iii) who live apart at all •times during 
the last 6 months of the calendar year, and 
B) such child is in the custody of one or both 
of his parents for more than one-half of the 
calendar year, 
such child shall be treated, for purposes of 
subsection (a) , as receiving over half of his 
support during the calendar year from the parent 
having custody for a greater portion of the calendar 
year (hereinafter in this subsection referred to as 
the "custodial parent"). 
2) Exception where custodial parent releases claim 
to exemption for the year.—A child of parents 
described in paragraph (1) shall be treated as 
having received over half of his support during a 
calendar year from the noncustodial parent if— 
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A) the custodial parent signs a written 
declaration (in such manner and form as the 
Secretary may by regulations prescribe) that such 
custodial parent will not claim such child as a 
dependent for any taxable year beginning in such 
calendar year, and 
B) the noncustodial parent attaches such 
written declaration to the noncustodial parent's 
return for the taxable year beginning during such 
calendar year. 
For purposes of this subsection, the term 
"noncustodial parent" means the parent who is not 
the custodial parent* 
3) Exception for multiple-support agreement.—This 
subsection shall not apply in any case where over 
half of the support of the child is treated as 
having been received from a taxpayer under the 
provisions of subsection (c). 
4) Exception for certain pre-1985 instruments.— 
A) In general.—A child of parents described 
in paragraph (1) shall be treated as having received 
over half his support during a calendar year from 
the noncustodial parent i f — 
i) a qualified pre-1985 instrument between 
the partnes applicable to the taxable year beginning 
in such calendar year provides that the noncustodial 
parent shall be entitled to any deduction allowable 
under section 151 for such child, and 
ii) the noncustodial parent provides at 
least $600 for the support of such child during such 
calendar year. 
For purposes of this subparagraph, amounts expended 
for the support of a child or children shall be 
treated as received from the noncustodial parent to 
the extent that such parent provided amounts for 
such support. 
B) Qualified pre-1985 instrument.—For 
purposes of this paragraph, the term "qualified pre-
1985 instrument" means any decree of divorce or 
separate maintenance or written agreement— 
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i) which is executed before January 1, 
1985, 
ii) which on such date contains the 
provision described in subparagraph (A(i), and 
iii) which is not modified on or after 
such date in a modification which expressly provided 
that this paragraph shall not apply to such decree 
or agreement. 
5) Special rule for support received from new spouse 
of parent.—For purposes of this subsection, in the 
case of the remarriage of a parent, support of a 
child received from the parent's spouse shall be 
treated as received from the parent. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is an appeal from a final Order modifying a Decree 
of Dissolution and Supplemental Agreement entered after a 
trial on plaintiff-appellant's Complaint (Petition to Modify) 
and defendant-respondent's Counterclaim (Counter Petition to 
Modify) in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Judge Boyd L. 
Park presiding, in which the lower court modified a Decree of 
Dissolution in the Common Pleas Court of Greene County, Ohio, 
Division of Domestic Relations, which Decree of Dissolution 
was entered on the 14th day of November, 1984. Said Ohio 
Dissolution Decree had been properly registered in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court pursuant to the full faith and credit 
given to foreign decrees in the State of Utah. 
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B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
The Decree of Dissolution was originally signed in this 
matter by the Honorable Judge Judson L. Shattuck, Jr., in the 
Common Pleas Court of Greene County, Ohio, Division of 
Domestic Relations, and subsequently filed with the same court 
on November 14, 1984. (R. 6-18) Paragraph 2 of the Order of 
the Court required both parties to "fulfill each and every 
obligation imposed by the Separation Agreement and Supplement 
Agreement contained herein and agreed to by the petitioners." 
(R.7) 
In paragraph 4 of the Supplemental Agreement entered into 
by the parties, it states as follows: 
Concerning tax exemptions, the husband shall be 
entitled to claim all of the minor children on his 
federal, state and city income tax returns for the 
calendar year 1984. For the calendar years 1985, 
and thereafter, the rules promulgated by the 
Internal Revenue Service shall apply in making such 
determination(s). (R. 18) 
Subsequently, plaintiff-appellant moved from Ohio to the 
State of Utah. On or about December 23, 1986, plaintiff filed 
a Petition to Modify the Ohio Decree of Divorce regarding 
delinquent child support, medical expenses and the real 
property of the parties located at 426 Lewis Drive, Fairborn, 
OH. (R. 1-18) Defendant-respondent filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim alleging, among other things, that defendant-
respondent be awarded the federal and state income tax 
exemptions for the minor children. (R. 19-24) 
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On or about the 22nd day of September, 1987, Commissioner 
Howard H. Maetani, Domestic Relations Commissioner of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court ruled regarding the issues 
pending on plaintiff-appellant's Petition and defendant-
respondent's Counter Petition. Regarding the federal and 
state income tax exemptions for the minor children, 
Commissioner Maetani stated as follows: 
Defendant shall have the minor children of the 
parties for the purpose of income tax deductions or 
exemptions as long as defendant is responsible for 
the mortgage payment on the Ohio home as set out in 
paragraph 3, and defendant is current on his child 
support obligation for the year in question. (R. 
60) 
Consequently, on the 10th day of July, 1987, plaintiff-
appellant filed her objection to the Commissioner's 
Recommendation in which she objected to the Court awarding 
defendant-respondent the federal and state income tax 
exemption for the minor children, since she, with the 
assistance of her husband, paid over 57% of the total cost and 
expenses necessary for the support of the minor children. (R. 
41-44 and R. 62-63) The matter was subsequently referred to 
the Honorable Judge Boyd L. Park on plaintiff-appellant's 
objection to the Commissioner's Recommendation and scheduled 
for trial on November 16, 1987 at 1:30 p.m. (R. 64) 
C. DISPOSITION OP COURT BELOW. 
Trial was held as scheduled before the Honorable Judge 
Boyd L. Park on the 16th day of November, 1987. Plaintiff-
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appellant appeared and was represented by her attorney, Jay 
Fittf and defendant-respondent appeared and was represented 
by his attorney, Frederick A. Jackman. (R. 65) No evidence 
was introduced at trial by either party in regards to what the 
status of the parties was at the time of the decree of divorce 
in this matter on the 14th day of November, 1984, wherein 
defendant-respondent was awarded the federal, state and city 
income tax exemptions for the minor children, but that in the 
years 1985 and following the rules promulgated by the Internal 
Revenue Service would apply in making such determinations. 
(R. 220-289) Consequently, there was no evidence introduced 
at trial from which it could be determined that a material 
change of circumstances had taken place for purposes of 
modifying the existing decree of divorce between the parties. 
Instead, the evidence introduced at trial centered on the 
current circumstances between the parties and what percentage 
of contribution each had made towards the support of the 
children. The evidence introduced at trial in this matter 
showed that plaintiff-appellant spent approximately $1,000.00 
per month for the support of the minor children (R. 241) 
Defendant-respondent pays approximately $481.00 per month for 
child support of the minor children. Consequently, plaintiff-
appellant argued that she paid more than one-half of the 
children's monthly living expenses. [$1,000.00 per month 
living expenses was that amount left over after the court had 
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refused to allow plaintiff to include child care expenses, 
life insurance expenses for the minor children, entertainment 
expenses and Christmas present expenses. (R. 223-240)] 
After hearing the evidence, the court ruled that 
defendant should be entitled to the federal and state income 
tax exemptions for the minor children for the years 1987 and 
1988 if defendant-respondent's child support was kept current, 
and following the year 1988, the parties were to cooperate and 
work out tax exemptions: 
I'm going to award the income tax exemptions to the 
defendant for 1987 and unless that is provided that 
he is current with his child support. If he is 
current for his child support in 1988 I am going to 
award him the tax exemptions for 1988 because the 
plaintiff will not graduate until April of 1988. 
Her husband is in the process of lifting himself up 
in a new position, so it appears that through 1988 
certainly the plaintiff will be, or rather the 
defendant, will be putting out the bulk of the 
money. 
Following the year 1988, I don't have a formula but 
following the year 1988 I think the parties should 
be ordered to cooperate with regard to tax 
exemptions and possibly split tax exemptions so that 
the plaintiff has some based somewhat on the ratio 
of the total incomes that are coming into both 
households and the total parties that are being 
supported by those incomes, and that is going to 
require a little cooperation but I think it is well 
worth it to sit down and think about it when you do. 
You may also add the language to the extent that the 
cooperation creates the greatest cash flow to the 
two families for the purpose of rearing the 
children. (R. 283 & 284) 
Plaintiff-appellant subsequently filed a motion for a new 
trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
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alleging the court's decision regarding the federal and state 
income tax exemptions of the minor children was against the 
law, or in the alternative, was in error of law. (R. 78-92) 
Plaintiff's motion for a new trial was denied by the court in 
a ruling dated the 29th day of June, 1988. (R. 213) 
Plaintiff-appellant filed her Notice of Appeal on July 28, 
1988. (R. 214) 
D. STATEMENT OP PACTS, 
Plaintiff-appellant and defendant-respondent were married 
in Gordonsville, VA on December 21, 1973. (R. 6) During the 
course of their marriage, five children were born as issue of 
said marriage, to wit: Jonathan E. Tross, born September 4, 
1975; Rozanna L. Tross, born September 2, 1976; Jefferson S. 
Tross, born December 30, 1977; Cameron M. Tross, born March 
14, 1979; and Michel D. Tross, born September 3, 1981. (R. 6 
& 9) 
The parties were subsequently divorced by a Decree of 
Dissolution on the 14th day of November, 1984, by the 
Honorable Judge Judson L. Shattuck, Jr. in the Common Pleas 
Court of Greene County, Ohio Division of Domestic Relations. 
(R. 6-18) In said Decree of Dissolution, plaintiff-appellant 
was given the custody of the minor children of the parties 
with reasonable visitation to defendant-respondent. (R. 11 & 
12) Defendant-respondent was ordered to pay $120.00 per month 
in child support for each of the minor children of the parties 
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by military allotment (R. 12) . However, said child support 
was to abate fully for three months during each summer when 
defendant-respondent exercised his visitation with the minor 
children. (R. 17) 
During the marriage and at the time of the decree of 
divorce, plaintiff-appellant was not employed outside the 
home. However, it was contemplated in the Decree of 
Dissolution, that plaintiff-appellant would move with the 
minor children to the State of Utah to pursue her education 
at Brigham Young University. (R. 17) Consequently, defendant-
respondent was awarded the 1984 income tax exemptions for the 
minor children. In the years 1985 and thereafter, however, 
the rules promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service would 
be applicable in making such determinations. (R. 18) 
Subsequently, plaintiff-appellant moved from Ohio to the 
State of Utah where she began pursuing her education at 
Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah, where it was 
anticipated plaintiff-appellant would complete her bachelor's 
degree in April, 1988. (R. 223) In addition, plaintiff-
appellant has remarried and currently resides in the State of 
Utah with her new spouse, his son from a prior marriage, and 
the five children that were issue of her marriage to the 
defendant-respondent. (R. 231) At the time of the hearing 
before the Honorable Judge Boyd L. Park, plaintiff-appellant's 
husband was working for the 7-11 Corporation (R. 255). 
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Defendant-respondent had also moved from the State of 
Ohio. Defendant-respondent, however, was still employed with 
the military and earned approximately $38,000 per year. (R. 
268) 
Plaintiff-appellant filed her Petition to Modify Decree 
of Divorce on December 23, 1986 alleging that defendant-
respondent was consistently in arrears in child support; the 
visitation schedule caused hardship on the children; 
defendant-respondent had failed to maintain the military 
allotment for purposes of paying child support; defendant-
respondent had failed and refused to make payments of 
extraordinary medical and dental expenses; defendant-
respondent harassed plaintiff-appellant regarding 
insignificant decisions involving the children when she 
contacted him pursuant to the Decree of Divorce; and 
defendant-respondent had failed to allow plaintiff-appellant 
any knowledge or choice of the identity of the real estate 
broker with whom the marital home in Ohio had been listed for 
sale, and was not making any attempt to sell the property but 
was merely collecting the rent therefrom. In addition, 
plaintiff-appellant asserted that she had been required to 
hire the services of an attorney to represent her in the 
action and requested her reasonable court costs and attorneys 
fees. (R. 1-5) 
Defendant-respondent filed his Answer and Counterclaim 
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to plaintiff-appellant's Petition to Modify alleging that any 
rent on the marital property which is insufficient to cover 
the mortgage payment should be equally split between the 
parties and that any deficiencies in the sale of the marital 
property should be divided equally between the parties; the 
defendant-respondent should be entitled to perform all of the 
church ordinances having to do with the children as provided 
by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; should 
appellant-plaintiff remarry, that her new husband be 
restrained from interferring with the relationship that 
defendant-respondent has with the minor children of the 
parties; that both parties be required to maintain medical 
hospitalization, dental insurance on the minor children of the 
parties, and that they otherwise split equally any amounts not 
covered by insurance; defendant-respondent be given the 
federal tax exemptions for the minor children; that plaintiff-
appellant not be allowed to record telephone conversations 
between herself and defendant-respondent, and that plaintiff-
appellant's petition to modify had not been brought in good 
faith and therefore that defendant-respondent should be 
awarded his court costs and attorney's fees in bringing the 
matter before the court. (R. 19-24) 
A pre-trial settlement conference was had before the 
Honorable Commissioner Howard H. Maetani on the 29th day of 
June, 1987. After hearing arguments of counsel, the court 
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ruled as follows: 
1. That the real property located in Ohio would be 
listed for sale, and the net proceeds or net loss of sale 
should be equally divided between the parties. 
2. That the parties should alternate the period each 
year during the children's Christmas vacation from 5:00 p.m. 
on the day before Christmas vacation begins until 9:00 p.m. 
on the day before the Christmas vacation period ends. 
3. That defendant-respondent should be entitled to 
perform all church ordinances having to do with the children 
as provided by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, 
4. That the parties were restrained from interferring 
with the visitation of the other party or from the other 
party's relationship with the children and further, ordering 
the parties to take the necessary steps to restrain third 
parties from interferring with the children's relationship 
with either parent. 
5. That both parties be required to maintain medical, 
hospital and dental insurance on the minor children and to 
split equally any amounts not covered by insurance. Further, 
it was ordered that plaintiff-appellant have the minor 
children treated at a military installation if at all 
possible. 
6. That defendant have the minor children of the parties 
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for the purposes of income tax deductions or exemptiosn. 
7. That neither party be allowed to tape record 
conversations with the other party. 
8. That so long as defendant-respondent is paying his 
child support through military allottment that he shall 
determine the total amount of child support due for the year 
and divide that by twelve, and that shall be the amount due 
for the military allotment. 
9. That defendant-respondent have additional visitation 
with the minor children not more than three times during each 
calendar year by giving the plaintiff-appellant at least two 
weeks notice of his intent to visit. 
10. That both parties submit affidavits of attorneys 
fees within 10 days for further consideration by the court. 
(R. 46-51) 
Plaintiff-appellant filed her objection to the 
Commissioner's Recommendation on or about September 30, 1987. 
(R. 62-63) Consequently, trial was held on the matter before 
the Honorable Judge Boyd L. Park on the 16th day of November, 
1987. 
After hearing the evidence, the Court made the following 
modifications to the Commissioner's Recommendation: 
1. With regard to the real property in Ohio, that 
defendant be responsible for payment of the mortgage on the 
property and in the event the property was rented, that the 
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rent first be applied to the mortgage payment. In addition, 
any deficiency would be borne solely by defendant-respondent. 
After sale, any net proceeds of the sale should be divided 
equally between the parties. 
2. That defendant be required to maintain medical and 
dental expenses for the minor children unless plaintiff can 
have the children insured without extra cost to her, and that 
the parties otherwise split equally any amounts not covered 
by insurance. 
3. That the defendant should have additional visitation 
with the children not more than three times during each 
calendar year by giving the plaintiff at least two weeks 
notice of his intent to visit. In addition, plaintiff-
appellant was ordered to advise the defendant-respondent in 
advance regarding the major plans of her family. 
4. Defendant-respondent was awarded attorney's fees in 
an amount equal to any child support arrearage, and the 
attorney's fees were ordered to offset such arrearage. (R. 
221-228) 
Subsequently, plaintiff-appellant moved for a new trial 
pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
alleging that the decision of the judge was against the law 
and that material evidence was not introduced at trial as a 
result of inadequate representation by plaintiff-appellant's 
attorney. (R. 78-92) More specifically, plaintiff-appellant 
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alleged that the award of the federal and state income tax 
exemptions for the minor children was against the law in that 
it violated 26 U.S.C. Section 152(e). The Honorable Judge 
Boyd L. Park denied plaintiff-appellant's motion on the 29th 
day of June, 1988. (R. 213) Consequently, plaintiff-appellant 
filed her Notice of Appeal on the 28th day of July, 1988 
regarding the decision of the Honorable Judge Boyd L. Park in 
regards to the award of federal and state income tax 
exemptions of the minor children to defendant-respondent. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in failing to imply into the Decree 
of Divorce the rules promulgated by the Internal Revenue 
Service pursuant to the terms of the Dissolution Decree. 
Paragraph 4 of the Supplemental Agreement which was 
incorporated into the Decree of Dissolution by reference 
stated that defendant-respondent should be entitled to the 
federal and state income tax exemptions for the minor children 
for the year 1984. However: "for the calendar years 1985 and 
thereafter, the rules promulgated by the Internal Revenue 
Services shall apply in making such determination(s)." (R. 18) 
Consequently, 26 U.S.C. Sec. 152(e) must be implied into the 
Decree of Dissolution for purposes of determining who was 
entitled to the federal and state income tax exemptions for 
the minor children. 
Under the current provisions of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 152(e) 
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(1988), the custodial parent is entitled to the dependency 
exemptions for the minor children of the parties. The term 
"custodial parent" is defined in 26 U.S.C. Sec. 152(e)(1)(b) 
as a parent who has physical custody of the child for more 
than one-half of the calendar year. Consequently, in the 
present action plaintiff-appellant would be the custodial 
parent of the minor children since she has the minor children 
in her physical custody for approximately 9 1/2 months out of 
each year. 
Defendant-respondent would be entitled to the federal and 
state income tax exemptions for the minor children under the 
current version of 26 U.S.C. Sec. 152(e) (1988), only if the 
custodial parent signs a written waiver that he or she will 
not claim the child as a dependent, or if there is a qualified 
pre-1985 decree providing that the noncustodial parent is 
entitled to the exemption and the non-custodial parent 
provides at least $600.00 per year for the child's support. 
Neither of these exceptions are applicable, and therefore, by 
virtue of the Decree of Dissolution which implied into it the 
laws as enacted by the Internal Revenue Service, plaintiff-
appellant should be entitled to the federal and state income 
tax exemptions for the minor children. 
The second error of the trial court is failure to find 
a material change of circumstances prior to modifying the 
Decree of Dissolution regarding the federal and state income 
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tax exemptions for the minor children. There was no finding 
by the trial court of material change of circumstances for 
purposes of modifying the existing decree of divorce regarding 
the income tax exemptions for the minor children. There was 
no evidence presented by either party as to what circumstances 
existed between the parties at the time of the decree of 
divorce for purposes of determining whether a material change 
of circumstances had taken place. The trial court merely 
based their determination of federal and state income tax 
exemptions between the parties by virtue of the fact that 
plaintiff-appellant was obtaining her education at Brigham 
Young University and was not currently employed, and 
defendant-respondent was employed with the military and 
earning approximately $38,000.00 a year. (R. 280-289) There 
was no indication of a material change of circumstances 
substantial and material enough for purposes of modifying the 
decree of divorce to allow defendant-respondent to claim the 
minor children as income tax exemptions. 
Instead, in determining which of the parties should 
receive the federal and state income tax exemptions, the trial 
court centered its analysis on who had provided the most 
financial support for the minor children. This method of 
analysis is no longer relevant under the current status of the 
Federal Internal Revenue Code, which awards the dependency 
exemption for the minor children to the custodial parent 
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unless the custodial parent signs a declaration stating he or 
she will not be claiming the minor children as dependents on 
the custodial parent's return, or there is a qualified pre-
1985 decree awarding the exemptions to the non-custodial 
parent. Such is not the case in the present action. 
However, even assuming arguendo that the proportion of 
contribution towards the minor children's support is the 
proper yardstick for determining who should get the federal 
and state income tax exemptions for the minor children, the 
trial court erred in failing to consider child care expenses, 
life insurance expenses, entertainment expenses and gift 
expenses incurred by plaintiff-appellant in determining 
plaintiff-appellant's contributions toward the total 
children's annual support. 
However, under the current status of 2 6 U.S.C. Sec. 
152(e), and the express wording of the Decree requiring that 
the Internal Revenue Code be implied into the Decree of 
Divorce in making future determinations regarding who should 
receive the federal and state income tax exemptions for the 
minor children, the trial court abused its discretion in 
awarding the same to the defendant-respondent. Consequently, 
the trial court's decision should be reversed, and plaintiff-
appellant should receive the federal and state income 
exemptions for the minor children. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO IMPLY INTO 
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE THE RULES PROMULGATED BY THE 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF 
THE DISSOLUTION DECREE, 
The parties to this action were divorced on November 14, 
1984 pursuant to a Decree of Dissolution signed by the 
Honorable Judge Judson L. Shattuck, Jr. in the Common Pleas 
Court of Greene County, Ohio, Division of Domestic Relations, 
The Decree of Dissolution stated in paragraph 2 as follows: 
The petitioners are ordered to fulfill each and 
every obligation imposed by the separation agreement 
and supplemental agreement contained herein and 
agreed by the petitioners. 
The Supplemental Agreement attached to the Decree of 
Dissolution and incorporated therein by reference, stated in 
Article IV, paragarph 4, as follows: 
Concerning tax exemptions, the husband shall be 
entitled to claim all of the minor children on his 
federal, state and city income tax returns for the 
calendar year 1984. For the calendar years 1985, 
and thereafter, the rules promulgated by the 
Internal Revenue Service shall apply in making such 
determination(s). 
Consequently, by virtue of Article IV, Para. 4 of the 
Supplemental Agreement, the Court must imply into the Decree 
of Divorce the current provisions of the Internal Revenue Code 
regarding the federal income tax exemptions for the minor 
children. 
The current provisions of the Internal Revenue Code 
provide that the custodial parent is entitled to the income 
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tax dependency exemptions for the minor children. [26 U.S.C. 
Sec, 152(e)] The child is treated "as having received over 
half of his support during the calendar from the parent having 
custody for a greater portion of the calendar year. 26 U.S.C. 
Sec. 152(e)(1)(b). Therefore, by virture of implying into the 
Decree of Dissolution the provisions of U.S. U.S.C. Section 
152(e), the custodial parent is presumed to have contributed 
the most towards the minor child's support. 
In the present action, the Decree of Dissolution between 
the parties awarded plaintiff-appellant custody of the five 
minor children of the parties with visitation to defendant-
respondent. (R. 16 & 17) Plaintiff-appellant has the physical 
care, custody and control of the minor children for 
approximately 9 1/2 months out of each calendar year and 
therefore is entitled to the dependency exemption for the 
minor children pursuant to 26 U.S.C. Sec. 152(e)(1). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND A 
MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES PRIOR TO MODIFYING 
THE DECREE OF DISSOLUTION REGARDING FEDERAL AND 
STATE INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-3-5(3) allows the court 
continuing jurisdiction 
...to make subsequent changes or new orders for the 
support and maintenance of the parites, the custody 
of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health and dental care, or the distribution of the 
property as is reasonable and necessary. 
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However, before a modification to a decree of divorce can be 
made, the party requesting the modification must show that a 
substantial change of circumstances has occurred since the 
time of the decree of divorce justifying modification of the 
decree. See Mineer v. Mineer, 706 P«2d 1060 (Utah, 1985), 
Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608 (Utah, 1984), Lord v. Shaw, 682 
P,2d 853 (Utah, 1984), and Woodward v. Woodward. 709 P.2d 393 
(Utah, 1985). 
The transcript of the hearing that transpired on the 16th 
day of November, 1987 is devoid of any evidence of what the 
circumstances of the parties were at the time of the decree 
of divorce in this matter. (R. 220-289) Evidence mainly 
consisted of testimony by plaintiff-appellant and defendant-
respondent regarding their present financial circumstances. 
(R. 223-245 wherein plaintiff-appellant testifies regarding 
her financial situation and R. 267 wherein defendant-
respondent testifies that he is desirous of having the federal 
income tax exemptions for the minor children.) 
After hearing the evidence as presented by the parties, 
the court expressed its feelings as follows: 
Well you heard my feelings about that, and that is 
that I am concerned about creating the largest 
stream of cash flow for the benefit of the children 
and I don't see any reason to forego anything if we 
can avoid it and pay the government. I realize that 
you get your money from the government, but I think 
they have got their hand in their pocket as deep as 
I would like to see it. I don't see any reason to 
make an order that would allow them to stick it in 
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there any deeper. (R. 269) 
The Court then entered its order as follows: 
I am going to award the income tax deductions to the 
defendant for 1987 and unless and that is provided 
that he is current with his child support. If he 
is current for his child support in 1988, I am going 
to award him the tax exemptions for 1988 because the 
plaintiff will not graduate until April of 1988. 
Her husband is in the process of lifting himself up 
to a new position, so it appears that through 1988 
certainly the plaintiff, but rather the defendant, 
will be putting out the bulk of the money. 
Following the year 1988 I don't have a formula but 
following the year 1988 I think the parties should 
be ordered to cooperate with regard to tax 
exemptions and possible split tax exemptions so that 
plaintiff has some and defendant has some based 
somewhat on the ratio of the total incomes that are 
coming into both households and the total parties 
that are being supported by those incomes and that 
is going to require a little cooperation but I think 
it is well worth it to sit down and think about it 
when you do it. You may also add the language to 
the extent that the cooperation creates the greatest 
cash flow to the two families for the purposes of 
rearing the children. (R. 283-284) 
The court's decision is absent any specific findings 
regarding what material change of circumstances had occurred 
to prompt the court to award the state and federal dependency 
exemptions to defendant-respondent. 
The court also failed to set forth detailed findings of 
fact regarding its decision to award defendant the dependency 
exemptions. The court has merely stated in paragraph 8 of its 
order as follows: "that defendant shall have the minor 
children of the parties for purposes of income tax deductions 
or exemptions for the years 1987 and 1988 if the child support 
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is kept current and following the year 1988 the parties are 
to cooperate and work out that tax exemptions. (R.283-284) 
In Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996 (Utah, 1987), the court 
states as follows: 
The findings of fact must show that the court's 
judgment or decree follows logically from and is 
supported by the evidence. The findings should be 
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary 
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate 
conclusions on each factual issue was reached. 
There is no specific finding by the court showing the 
reason and basis upon which it found a material change of 
circumstances for purposes of modifying the decree of divorce 
to require plaintiff to give up the federal and state income 
tax exemptions for the minor children of the parties so as to 
comply with the standard propounded in Acton v. Deliran. It 
is axiomatic that even the court expressed a desire to create 
the greatest flow of income for purposes of rearing the 
children, the Court has actually created a lower stream of 
income for purposes of supporting the minor children. 
Plaintiff-appellant and her current husband now have less 
income because more of it shall be spent in federal and state 
income taxes. Defendant-respondent's income will increase 
because of the federal and state income tax exemptions for the 
minor children. However, the amount of increase to the 
defendant was not passed on to the minor children through an 
increase in child support. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT AWARDED THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR THE MINOR CHILDREN TO THE 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT IN VIOLATION OF FFEDERAL LAW. 
Although under the general rule of 2 6 U.S.C. Section 
152(e) plaintiff-appellant would be entitled to the tax 
exemptions for the minor children, 26 U.S.C. Sec, 152(e)(2) 
allows basically two exemptions to the custodial parent's 
receipt of the federal income tax exemptions for the minor 
children: 
1. The custodial parent signs a written 
declaration (in such manner and form as the 
secretary may by regulations prescribed) that such 
custodial parent will not claim such child as a 
dependent for any taxable year beginning in such 
calendar year, 26 U.S. Code Sec. 152(e)(2)(A) 
2. That there is a pre-qualified 1985 
instrument applicable to the taxable year beginning 
in such calendar providing that the noncustodial 
parent shall be entitled to the federal income tax 
exemption for the minor children, and the 
noncustodial parent provides at least $600 of 
support for the child during such calendar year. 
26 U.S. Code Sec. 152(e)(4)(A) 
The first exception to the custodial parent receiving the 
federal tax exemption for the minor children would not be 
applicable in the present action. Although plaintiff-
appellant agreed pursuant to the Supplemental Agreement 
entered into by the parties that defendant-respondent could 
have the minor children for federal income tax purposes for 
the calendar year 1984, no such agreement exists between the 
parties regarding the following taxable years. Indeed, 
plaintiff-appellant is not willing to execute the voluntary 
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relinquishment of the dependency exemption for the minor 
children. Consequently, the first exception, as above stated, 
would not be applicable. 
Defendant-respondent maintained in his opposition to 
plaintiff-appellant's motion for a new trial that the court 
could order the custodial parent to execute the relinquishment 
of federal income tax exemptions for the minor children. (R. 
98-100) In essence, defendant-respondent asserted that the 
trial court can order the custodial parent to execute the 
written waiver provided for in 16 U.S. Code Sec. 152(e)(2). 
However, this court has previously held otherwise. 
In the case of Fullmer v. Fullmer, 91 Utah Adv.Rpts. 25 
(Sept. 16, 1988), this court stated: 
Although many state courts interpreting the 
predecessor provisions to Section 152(e) have 
determined that they have discretion to award the 
exemption in a divorce proceeding, we agree with the 
court that have concluded they do not have the 
authority to grant the exemption contrary to the 
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, (citations 
omitted) 
See also Martinez v. Martinez, 90 Utah Adv.Rpts. 35 (April 19, 
1988). 
Consequently, the trial court had no discretion in 
determining who should be entitled to the federal and state 
income tax exemptions for the minor children. The trial court 
had no authority to grant the federal tax exemption to 
defendant to which he was not entitled under the Internal 
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Revenue Code, 
IV, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER 
CHILD CARE EXPENSES, LIFE INSURANCE EXPENSES, 
ENTERTAINMENT EXPENSES AND CHRISTMAS PRESENT 
EXPENSES FOR THE MINOR CHILDREN IN DETERMINING 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTf 8 CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARDS THE 
MINOR CHILDREN'S SUPPORT. 
In determining that defendant-respondent was entitled to 
the federal and state income tax exemptions for the minor 
children, the court placed a great deal of weight on the 
relative contributions of the parties toward the support of 
the children. (R. 269-279) 
Under the current status of 26 U.S.C. Sec, 152(e), the 
contribution of support by either parent is no longer relevant 
for purposes of determining the dependency exemption for the 
minor children. Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the 
parent who contributes more to the children's support should 
receive the dependency exemptions under the current status of 
the federal tax law, the court still erred in its analysis. 
The evidence induced at trial in this matter and showed 
that plaintiff-appellant spent approximately $1,000 per month 
for the support of the minor children. (R. 241) Defendant-
respondent pays approximately $481 per month for the child 
support of the minor children. Consequently, plaintiff-
appellant pays more than one-half of the children's monthly 
living expenses. 
In arriving at the $1,000 per month living expenses for 
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the minor children, plaintiff-appellant was not allowed to 
include child care expenses, life insurance expenses, 
entertainment expenses and Christmas present expenses for the 
minor children in determining her contribution towards the 
childrenfs support. (R. 223-241) Said items were not included 
in determining plaintiff-appellant's support for the minor 
children because the court deemed them to be discretionary 
expenses. 
There is no provision in 26 U.S.C. Sec. 152(e) which 
distinguishes between discretionary and nondiscretionary 
expenses for the minor children for purposes of determining 
who contributes the greatest portion of the child's support. 
Indeed, even if there were, the court erred in excluding child 
care expenses, life insurance expenses, entertainment expenses 
and Christmas present expenses for the children as 
discretionary. 
For example, in the case of child care expenses, the new 
child support guidelines which are currently in effect and 
were proposed by the Utah Child Support Task Force state as 
follows: 
The reasonable cost of child care expenses actually 
incurred to be added to the prior basic child 
support need. The child care costs considered 
include child care costs to allow the custodial 
parent to work, to look for work, and to complete 
education as a pre-requisite for obtaining 
employment. 
Consequently, the new child support schedules in effect 
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beginning November 1, 1988 allow child care to be added to the 
base amount of child support for purposes of determination of 
the amount the noncustodial parent should pay to the custodial 
prent. In addition, the child support guidelines are adjusted 
to compensate for the fact the federal and state income tax 
exemptions for the minor children are awarded to the custodial 
parent, (See Utah Child Support Task Force Report on Proposed 
Child Support Guidelines) 
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT 
The trial court erred in failing to imply into the decree 
of divorce the rules promulgated by the Internal Revenue 
Service pursuant to the terms of the Dissolution Decree. Said 
decree specifically stated that the rules promulgated by the 
Internal Revenue Service would be controlling in determining 
who would receive the federal tax exemptions for the minor 
children in the years 1985 and thereafter. By awarding 
defendant-respondent the federal and state tax exemptions for 
the minor children, the court not only violated the terms of 
the Decree of Dissolution itself, but failed to find a 
material change of circumstances for purposes of modifying the 
existing decree of divorce. Consequently, the award of the 
federal and state income tax exemptions for the minor children 
to defendant-respondent was in violation of 26 U.S.C. 152(e) 
which currently awards the tax exemptions for the minor 
children to the custodial parent. As a result, plaintiff-
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appellant seeks relief as follows: 
1. TAX EXEMPTIONS: A reversal of the order modifying 
the Decree of Dissolution to allow defendant-respondent the 
federal and state income tax exemptions for the minor children 
for the years 1987 and 1988, and the order requiring the 
parties to work out the tax exemptions for the years 1988 and 
thereafter. Plaintiff-appellant seeks a return to the 
original award of tax exemptions as required in the Decree of 
Dissolution which allowed the rules promulgated by the 
Internal Revenue Service to control in determining who got the 
federal and state income tax exemptions for the minor 
children. 
2. ATTORNEYS PEES: An award of attorney's fees and 
costs to plaintiff-appellant to be paid by defendant-
respondent for plaintiff-appellant's attorney's benefit. 
Plaintiff-appellant does not have the financial resources to 
pay her attorney's fees and costs in this appeal, she has been 
forced to incur such fees and costs to pursue her rights in 
the matter. 
DATED this JS( day of November, 1988. 
TERRI C. BINGHAM 3? 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
the foregoing, postage prepaid, to the following on the 
day of November, 1988: 
Frederick A. Jackman 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 300 
Orem, UT 84058 
^XCIA. C &(jy\^mp/^_ 
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Attorney for Plaintiff 
1325 South 300 East, Suite 100 " { L 




IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATS Or UTAH 
—ocoOooo— 
MARY C. L2ARTLETT, COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM P. TROSS, 
Defendant. Civil No. <JV %(p 3/0/ 
—oooOooo— 
The plaintiff, for cause of action against the defendant, 
alleges as follows: 
1. The plaintiff is a resident of the State of Utah 
residing in Utah County. 
2. The defendant is not a resident of the State of Utah, 
being a member of Armed Forces of the United States of America. 
3. The plaintiff and the defendant were formerly wife and 
husband. 
4. The marriage of the plaintiff and the defendant was 
terminated by a Decree of Dissolution, a copy of wnich is 
attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit "A". 
5. The said Decree of Dissolution is entitled to full 
faith and credit under the laws of tne United States and the 
State of Utah. 
6. Paragracn 2) of the said Decree of Dissolution iwakes 
reference to a "Separation Agreement", a copy of which is 
attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit "Bw, and 
"Supplemental Agreement", a copy of which is attached hereto and 
made a part hereof as Exhibit "C". 
7. Article 4 of the said Separation Agreement, entitled 
"CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT" granted custody of the minor children 
of the parties to the plaintiff and provided for the payment of 
child support. 
8. Article 4 of the said Separation Agreement was modified 
by the said Supplemental Agreement. 
9. The defendant has withheld child support, being 
constantly in arrears by at least one month. 
10. The visitation schedule causes hardship on the children 
due to their inability to participate in organized community 
activities which include baseball and other athletic activities, 
and during the exercise of visitation the defendant speaks badly 
of the plaintiff to the children. 
11. The defendant has refused to maintain the military 
allotment for the purpose of paying chiLd support. 
12. The defendant has failed and refused to make payment of 
extraordinary medical, dental and/or optical expenses, claiming 
that extraordinary should be defined as emergency. 
13. The Supplemental Agreement contains the provision that 
the defendant shall be contacted in all matters regarding the 
children, but the defendant's conduct with regard to this is to 
harass the plaintiff regarding tne most insignificant c: deci-
sions reducing each and every contact between tne plaintiff and 
the defendant to a quarrel. 
14. The method of exercise of visitation by the defendant 
is oppressive to the plaintiff and to the children. 
16. Article 3 of the said Separation Agreement entitled 
"DIVISION OF PROPERTY" provides that real property located at 426 
Lewis Drive, Fairborn, Ohio, be forthwith listed for sale with a 
mutually agreeable broker, giving the plaintiff the sole and 
exclusive possession of the saia premises and requiring the 
defendant to make all payments due on the mortgage. 
17. The defendant has failed and refused to allow the 
plaintiff any choice in the selection of tne real estate broker 
or knowledge of the identity of the real estate broker selected 
by the defendant. 
18. When the plaintiff has learned of the identity of the 
real estate broker selected by the defendant, the defendant 
discharges the real estate broker. 
19. The plaintiff has vacated the said real property for 
the purpose of residing in Utah County, Utah, to pursue her 
education. 
20. The defendant has leased or rented the said real 
property and has kept the rents to himself; the amount of which 
is unknown to the plaintiff at this time. 
21. The defendant is making no effort to sell the said real 
property and is not allowing the plaintiff to do anything to 
accomplish the sale thereof. 
22. The plaintiff nas oeen required to obtain the assis-
tance of an attorney at law for the purpose of pursuing ner 
remedies as prayed herein. 
Wherefore the plaintiff prays judgment against the defendant 
as follows: 
1. That the Decree of Dissolution, Common Pleas Court of 
Greene County Ohio, Division of Domestic Relations, Case No 
84-Dr-949, be made a decree of trie State of Utah. 
2. That the plaintiff have judgment against the defendant 
as an for child support arrearage in an amount to be proved at 
trial. 
3. That the provisions of child support be modified so 
as to eliminate the abatement of child support during the periods 
the defendant exercises visitation. 
4. That the periods of visitation be modified to permit 
the children to participate in community activities and that 
visitation be'conducted in a manner not to be oppressive on the 
plaintiff or on the children. 
5. That the word "extraordinary" be defined liberally with 
regard to the payment of medical, dental and optical expenses. 
6. That the plaintiff be authorized to exercise custodial 
discretion regarding the children's welfare without having to 
submit to the defendant's harassment. 
7. That the plaintiff be named the principal agent of the 
parties for the purpose of selling the said real property. 
8. That the plaintiff have judgment against the defendant 
as and for rents received on trie said real property in an amount 
to be provec at trial. 
9. That the defendant oe ordered to uay child support by 
military pay allotment. 
10. That the plaintiff nave juagment against tne cefencant 
as and for attorney's fees in a reasonable ainount to oe proved at 
trial. 
11. For sucn other and further relief as to the court nay 
seem just and meet in the premises. 
Dated zhis 23rd day of December*] 1986. 
^ ^ a V F i t t x 




IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT OF GREENE COUNTY, OHIO 
lirO'A <\ C'.IAK DIVISION OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 
IN THE MATTER OF: * CASE NO. 84-DR-949 
(Judge Shat tuck) 
WILLIAM P. TROSS * 
- a n d - * DECREE OF DISSOLUTION 
MARY C. TROSS * 
P e t i t i o n e r s . * 
The Court f i n d s t h a t t h e P e t i t i o n e r s , William P. Tross and 
Mary C. Tross , have each been a r e s i d e n t of the S t a t e of Ohio-and 
t h e County of Greene f o r at l e a s t s i x (6) months immediate ly , 
preceding the date of the f i l i n g of the P e t i t i o n h e r e i n . 
The C o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e P e t i t i o n e r s were m a r r i e d in , 
Gordonsv i l l e , V i r g i n i a , on December 2 1 , 1 9 7 3 , and t h a t f i v e (5-) 
c h i l d r e n , namely , Jonathan E . T r o s s , age n i n e (9) years (DOB: 
9 / 4 / 7 5 ) , Rozanna L. T r o s s , age e i g h t (8 ) y e a r s (DOB: 9 / 2 / 7 6 ) ) 
J e f f e r s o n S. Tross , age s i x (6) years (DOB: 1 2 / 3 0 / 7 7 ) , Cameron 
M. T r o s s , a g e f i v e (5 ) y e a r s (DOB: 3 / 1 4 / 7 9 ) , and Miche l &. 
T r o s s , age t h r e e (3) y e a r s (DOB: 9 / 3 / 8 1 ) , have been born a s 
i s s u e of sa id marriage. 
This matter came on for h e a r i n g on November 14 , 1984, ^nore 
than t h i r t y (30 ) days hav ing e l a p s e d a f t e r t h e f i l i n g of t h e 
P e t i t i o n , the p a r t i e s both appearing p e r s o n a l l y before the Court. 
SCHLAFMAN
 § AND FODAL ^ ^ g , T «'/\ * 
The C o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e P e t i t i o n e r s , upon e x a m i n a t i o n u n d e r 
o a t h , v o l u n t a r i l y e n t e r e d i n t o t h e S e p a r a t i o n A g r e e m e n t a n d 
S u p p l e m e n t a l A g r e e m e n t e m b o d i e d i n t h e P e t i t i o n , t h a t e a c h 
P e t i t i o n e r i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e t e r m s of s a i d A g r e e m e n t s , and 
t h a t e ach P e t i t i o n e r d e s i r e s t o h a v e t h e m a r r i a g e d i s s o l v e d . 
Upon a r e v i e w of t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e P e t i t i o n e r s , a n d t h e 
P e t i t i o n t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e S e p a r a t i o n Agreement and S u p p l e m e n t a l 
A g r e e m e n t , wh ich i n c l u d e a l l of t h e r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d i n 
d e t e r m i n i n g p r o p e r t y s e t t l e m e n t , c h i l d c u s t o d y and s u p p o r t , a n d 
a l i m o n y , i n c l u d i n g t h o s e e n u m e r a t e d i n t h e s t a t u t e s , t h e C o u r t 
h e r e b y a p p r o v e s t h e S e p a r a t i o n A g r e e m e n t a n d S u p p l e m e n t a l 
A g r e e m e n t s u b m i t t e d by t h e P e t i t i o n e r s , a n d f i n d s t h a t s a i d 
A g r e e m e n t s a r e f a i r and e q u i t a b l e , and f u r t h e r o r d e r s t h a t t r u e 
c o p i e s of which a r e a t t a c h e d h e r e t o , be a n d t h e same a r e made a 
p a r t of t h i s o r d e r and d e c r e e . 
IT I S , THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED t h a t : 
1) The marriage e x i s t i n g between t h e P e t i t i o n e r s be , and 
the same hereby i s , dissolved and the p a r t i e s are hereby released 
from the ob l iga t ions of t h e i r marriage, except as he re inaf te r se t . 
f o r t h . 
2) The P e t i t i o n e r s a r e ORDERED t o f u l f i l l e ach and e v e r y 
o b l i g a t i o n imposed by t h e S e p a r a t i o n A g r e e m e n t and S u p p l e m e n t a l 
Agreement c o n t a i n e d h e r e i n and a g r e e d by t h e P e t i t i o n e r s . 
APPROVED: 
'JUDGE/} UD^ON L. 5 HATT'UCK
 f / / jR / ^ - ^ 
c ~ u i Acuaw ANin PonAi 
SCHLAFMAN AND FODAL CO., L.P.A, 
Attorneys for the Petitioner, 
Mary C. Tross 
By: *'/?/?*Adfi 
Joe R. Fodal 
^ 
SCHLAFMAN AND FODAL 
SEPARATION AGREEMENT 
This Agreement made and entered into between William P. Tross, 
hereinafter referred to as Husband, and Mary C* Tross, hereinafter 
referred to as Wife, both of whom represent that: 
1. The parties hereto were married at Gordonsville, Viginia, 
on December 21, 1973; 
2. There are five (5) children born as issue of said marriage^ 
namely, Johnathan E. Tross, age nine (9) years (DOB: 9/4/75), 
Rozanna L. Tross, age eight (8) years, (DOB: 9/2/76), Jefferson S. 
Tross, age six (6) years (DOB: 12/30/77), Cameron M. Tross, age 
five (5) years (DOB: 3/14/79), and Michel D. Tross, age three (3) 
years (DOB: 9/3/81); 
3. Differences have arisen between the parties and they are 
now living separate and apart from each other; 
4. The parties hereto desire to, and by this Agreement do, 
settle and determine and hereby provide for a division of all 
property belonging to the parties or to either of them. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and the 
mutual promises and agreements hereinafter set forth, the parties 
hereto agree as follows: 
ARTICLE 1. SEPARATION 
Each party shall hereafter continue to live separate and apart 
from the other, and neither shall annoy, molest, interfere with or 
harass the other in any way or manner, either directly or indirectlly 
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ARTICLE 2. ALIMONY 
The Husband shall pay to the Wife no alimony. 
ARTICLE 3. DIVISION OF PROPERTY 
A) Real Estate; 
The Husband and the Wife owns as joint tenants a fee simple 
interest in the real estate located at 426 Lewis Drive, Fairborn, 
Greene County, Ohio. Said real estate shall be divided upon the 
following terms and conditions: 
1. The property shall forthwith be listed for sale 
with a mutually agreeable broker and sold for a mutually 
agreeable sale price; until said sale, the Wife shall 
have the sole and exclusive possession of said premises; 
2. Until sale, the Husband shall pay, and save 
the Wife harmless, as to payments due 6n the mortgage; 
3. After sale, the net proceeds of the sale shall 
be divided equally between the Husband and the Wife. 
B) Household Goods, Furniture and Furinshings: 
The Wife shall retain, free and clear of any claim of the 
Husband, all right, title and interest in all of the household 
goods, the following items which shall be retained by the Husband: 
1. Last Supper painting 
2. Gold-green loveseat 
3. Hide-a-bed couch 
4. Coffee table 
5. One (1) end table 
6. Two (2) lamps 
7. Kitchen table 
8. Six (6) kitchen chairs 
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9. Beige file cabinet 
10. Two (2) shelf units 
11. Desk lamp 
12. Ironing board 
13. Iron 
14. China 
15. Roll Top Desk 
C) Automobiles; 
1. The Husband shall transfer to the Wife title to and 
ownership of the 1979 GMC Van; 
2. The Wife shall transfer to the Husband title to and 
ownership of the 1974 Opal Manta automobile. 
D) Bank Accounts: 
The Husband and Wife shall dissolve all of their joint bank 
accounts and mutually divide the monies therein. 
E) Mutual Funds: 
The Husband and Wife shall divide equally their holdings in 
the Fidelity Destiny Mutual Fund account. 
F) Life Insurance Policies: 
The Husband agrees to irrevocably designate each of the 
minor children as beneficiary on his existing life insurance 
policies for the sum of at least $15,000.00 for each child; this 
obligation shall terminate as to each respective child when the 
Husband's obligation to pay child support also terminates. The 
Husband shall retain ownership of the existing policies. 
ARTICLE 4. CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT 
1. The Wife shall have the sole and exclusive custody, care 
and control of the minor children; the Husband shall have the 
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right of reasonable visitation with reasonable notice to be 
provided to the Wife; 
2) The Husband shall pay, as and for child support, the sum 
of One Hundred Twenty Dollars ($120,00) per month per child? said 
payments shall be paid on a bi-monthly basis and shall be paid 
by military alottment; 
3) The Husband shall also be responsible for payment of all 
extraordinary medical, dental and optical expenses incurred oy 
the minor chidren; all efforts shall be made to have the minor 
children treated at a military installation if that is reasonable 
and practicable. 
ARTICLE 5- DEBTS AND EXPENSES 
A) The Husband shall pay, and save the Wife harmless, as 
to payment of the following debts: 
1. Master Card 
2. Elder Beerman 
B) Neither the Husband nor the Wife shall incur credit in 
the name of the other after execution of this Agreement* 
ARTICLE 6 COMPLETE SETTLEMENT 
This Agreement shall be a full and complete settlement of 
all alimony and property rights between the parties, each of whom 
does by the provisions hereof, release, satisfy and discharge all 
claims and demands against the other, inculding rights of dower/ 
inheritance, descent and distribution, allowance for year's 
support, exemption from administration, all rights as surviving 
SCHLAFMAN AND FODAL 
spouse, heir, legatee, and next of kin in the estate of the other, 
and all rights to administer the estate of the other, and in all 
property which each now or may hereafter acquire, except as hereid 
provided. 
ARTICLE 7. INCORPORATION INTO DECREE 
This Agreement, or any amendment thereto, shall be submitted 
to any Court in which a Petition for Dissolution of Marriage, or 
an action between the parties for Divorce may be pending and, if 
found by the Court to be fair and equitable and approved or 
validated by the Court, shall be incorporated into the final 
decree of said Court as the order of said Court. 
ARTICLE 8. IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENT 
Upon the execution of this Agreement, each party shall 
deliver to the other party, or permit the other party to take 
possession of all items of property to which each is entitled 
under the terms of this Agreement and all periodic payments 
required under the term of this Agreement shall commence. 
Within fifteen (15) days after journalization of a Decree 
of Dissolution of Marriage of the parties, or of a Decree of J 
Divorce between the partiesr incorporating this Agreement or any 
amendment or modification thereof, each party shall execute and 
deliver all deeds, conveyances, titles, certificates and other 
documents or instruments necessary and proper to effectuate all 
the terms of this Agreement. 
Upon failure of either party to execute and deliver any such 
deed, conveyance, title, certificate or other document or instru-
ment to the other party, this Agreement shall constitute and 
operate as such properly executed document and the County Auditor 
and County Recorder and any and all other public and private 
officials are hereby authorized and directed to accept this 
Agreement or a properly certified copy thereof in lieu of the 
document regularly required for such conveyance or transfer. 
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF: f1 . /?// . /'O 
i s ^ o u T — ' frSra*^ (!) William P. Tross, Hus 
A/La /i^n^ }ftr>j j * ^ 
band 
as ta (1) 3 o U
3 tO 12) T ^ as o (  ^j (2) Mary <TT Tross, Wife 
as to U) 
STATE OP OHIO, GREENE COUNTY)ss 
Before me, a notary public in and for said county and state, 
personally appeared the above-named William P. Tross, Husband, 
known to me to be one of the parties described in and who execute 
the foregoing instrument and acknowledged that he executed the 
same of his own free act and deed, for the uses and purposes 
therein mentioned. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed my name and 
affixed my official seal at Fairborn, Ohio, this 10th day of 
October, 1984. 
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. . 3, 1037 
STATE OF OHIO, GREENE COUNTY)ss 
Before me, a notary public in and for said county and stater 
personally appeared the above-named Mary C, Tross, Wife, known to 
me to be one of the parties described in and who executed the 
foregoing instrument and acknowledged that she executed the same 
of her own free act and deed, for the uses and purposes therein 
mentioned. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto subscribed my name and 
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THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into at Fairbornf Ohio, 
by and between William P. Tross and Mary C. Tross, hereinafter 
called Husband and Wife, respectively, WITSTESSHTM: 
WHEREAS, the Husband and Wife on or about October 10, 1984, 
entered into a Separation Agreement, settling all of their rights 
as to property division, alimony custody and child support? 
WHEREAS, the Husband and Wife, now desire to modify and 
supplement said Separation Agreement; 
Brow, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants 
and promises of the parties, the Husband and the Wife agree as 
follows: 
A) ARTICLE 4. CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT, Paragraph 1, 
shall be modified to read as follows: 
1. The Wife shall have the sole and exclusive custody, care 
and control of the minor children; the Husband and the Wife shall 
cooperate fully between themselves in discussing all decisions 
which may affect the general welfare and well being of the minor 
children; the Wife shall, at all times, keep in contact with the 
Husband to discuss with him fully and completely any decisions 
which must be made concerning these matters; the Husband shall 
have visitation rights as follows: 
a) In the event that the minor children reside in 
the City of Fairborn, the Husband shall have the right 
of reasonable visitation with reasonable notice to be 
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provided to the Wife; said v i s i t a t i o n r i g h t s s h a l l a l s o 
be a t l e a s t equ iva l en t to those defined in t h e C o u r t ' s 
S t a n d a r d O r d e r of V i s i t a t i o n , a copy of which i s 
a t t ached h e r e t o ; 
b) In the event t h a t the minor c h i l d r e n r e s i d e in 
t h e S t a t e of U t a h , w h i c h i s c o n t e m p l a t e d a f t e r 
December, 1984 , t h e Husband s h a l l h a v e v i s i t a t i o n 
r i g h t s : 
1 ) For t he per iod each year dur ing ' the 
summer, nonschool months, commencing from one 
(1 ) week a f t e r t he end of each s c h o o l y e a r 
and c o n t i n u i n g to t h e d a t e of one (1) week 
b e f o r e t h e commencement of t h e new s c h o o l 
y e a r ; c h i l d s u p p o r t s h a l l be a b a t e d f u l l y 
dur ing s a i d p e r i o d ; t h e Husband s h a l l make 
a l l t h e a r r a n g e m e n t s fo r t r a n s p o r t a t i o n to 
and from the r e s i d e n c e of the Wife; the cos t 
of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n s h a l l be paid f u l l y by t h e 
Husband u n l e s s t h e Wife i s ea rn ing a t l e a s t 
One Thousand D o l l a r s ($1 ,0 00 .00) or more per 
month in g r o s s e a r n i n g s , whe re in t h e Wife 
s h a l l be o b l i g e d t o pay o n e - h a l f ( 1 / 2 ) of 
s a i d e x p e n s e s fo r s a i d y e a r ; t h e Wife may 
choose t o f o r t h w i t h pay h e r s h a r e t o t h e 
Husband, o r , may choose to c r e d i t s a i d sum 
toward the Husband's o b l i g a t i o n to pay f u t u r e 
ch i l d suppor t ; 
2) For the p e r i o d each yea r dur ing the 
Christmas nonschool vaca t ion per iod from 1:00 
o ' c l o c k p.m. on C h r i s t m a s day c o n t i n u i n g 
u n t i l 9:00 o ' c l o c k p.m. on December 3 1 . 
3) At any and a l l r e a s o n a b l e t imes i n 
which t h e Husband may be in t h e a r e a where 
the minor ch i l d r en r e s i d e ; 
4) At any and a l l o t h e r t i m e s a g r e e d t o 
between t h e Husband and the Wife . 
B) ARTICLE 4 . CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT, s h a l l be m o d i f i e d 
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to include the following paragraph: 
4) Concerning tax exemptions, the Husband shall be entitled 
to claim all of the minor children on his federal, state and city 
income tax returns for the calendar year 1984. For the calendar 
years 1985, and thereafter, the rules promulgated by the Internal 
Revenue Service shall apply in making such determination(s). 
In all other respects, the Husband and the Wife ratify and 
affirm the other provisions set forth in said Separation 
Agreement. 
HB WITNESS WHEREOF, the Husband and the Wife have hereunto 
executed this Supplemental Agreement this / / ^ day of November, 
1984. 
Villi am P. Tross 
Mary C. T^s's 
STATE OF OHIO, GREENE COUNTY) s s . 
W i l l i a m P . T r o s s and Mary C. T r o s s , e a c h b e i n g d u l y sworn 
a c c o r d i n g t o l a w , d e p o s e s and s t a t e s t h a t h e / s h e h a s r e a d t h e 
f o r e g o i n g S u p p l e m e n t a l Agreemen t , and t h a t t h e s i g n i n g h e r e o f i s 
h i s / h e r own v o l u n t a r y a c t and d e e d . 
Ou ^^du^, 
Nota2^ P u b l i c 




FREDERICK A. JACKMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
1327 §outh 800 East, Suite 300 
nrem, UT 84058 
Phone: 225-1632 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY C. BARTLETT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
WILLIAM P. TROSS, 
Defendant. 
ANSWER & COUNTERCLAIM 
Civil No. CV 86 3101 
COMES NOW defendant by and through his attorney, 
Frederick A. Jackman and answers plaintiffTs Complaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Complaint fails to state a claim against this defendant 
upon which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
The defendant responds to the numbered paragraphs of 
plaintiff's Complaint as follows: 
1. Admit; 
2 . Admit; 
3. Admit; 
4. Admit; 
5 . Admit; 





11 . Deny; 
12. Deny; 
13. Admit the Supplemental Agreement contains the provision 
that the defendant shall be contacted in all matters regarding the 
children but deny each and every allegation contained in this 
paragraph. 
14. Deny; 




20. Admit the defendant has leased or rented the said real 
property but deny each and every other allegation contained in this 
paragraph; 
21 . Deny; 
22 . Deny; 
WHEREFORE, defendant prays that plaintiff's Complaint be 
dismissed, that she take nothing thereby and defendant be awarded 
the relief prayed for in his Counterclaim herein. 
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COUNTERCLAIM 
By way of Counterclaim the defendant alleges as follows: 
1. Defendant incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 
through 6 of the plaintifffs Complaint herein as if fully set 
forth herein, 
2. That Article 3 paragraph A 2 of the Separation Agree 
ment should be amended to read as follows: 
That upon remarriage of the wife, and upon her vacation 
of the real property, that the property be rented and that any 
rent collected be applied toward the mortgage payment. Should 
the rent be insufficient to cover the mortgage payment then any 
short-fall shall be split equally between the parties. 
3. That Article 3 paragraph A 3 should be modified to 
read as follows: 
After sale, the net proceeds of the sale shall be divide 
equally between the husband and the wife, should there be a defic-
iency between the amount of the mortgage and the net proceeds of 
the sale then such deficiency shall be paid equally by the parties 
4. That paragraph A 1 B 2 of the Supplemental Agreement 
should be modified to read as follows: 
That the parties shall alternate the period each year 
during the Christmas non-school vacation from 5:00 p.m., on the 
day the Christmas non-school vacation begins until 9:00 p.m. on 
the day before the Christmas non-school vacation ends beginning 
with the husband having custody of the children during the 
Christmas Vacation for 1987. 
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5« That a new paragraph be inserted as a new sub-paragr 
c to paragraph 1 of Article 4 to read as follows: 
That the husband, William P. Tross, shall be entitled to 
perfrom all of the Church Ordinances having to do with the childre 
as provided by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints 
including but not limited to the Baptism of each child, the 
Confirmation of each child, the Ordination to the Priesthood of ea 
child, and any and all other ecclesiastical ordinances. 
6. That a new cub-paragraph be inserted and number as 
sub-paragraph d of Article 4 paragraph 1 to read as follows: 
That in the event that the wife, Mary C. Tross, should 
remarry, then her new husband shall be restrained from interfering 
with the visitation of the husband, William P. Tross, or with his 
relationship with his children. In this regard the new husband 
shall be specifically restrained from criticizing the natural 
father of the children, participating in the Church Ordinances 
concerning the children where the natural father is entitled to 
officiate, and from contacting or harassing the natural father 
in and on behalf of his wife or the children. It is the intent of 
this provision to provide that discussions about the children and 
the relationship of the natural parents of the children to the 
children be handled between the parents without the interference 
of third parties. 
7. That Article 4 paragiaph 3 be amended to read as 
follows: 
That it is reasonable that both parties maintain 
medical hospitalization/dental insurance on the minor children of 
the parties and that they otherwise split equally any amounts not 
covered by insurance* And it is further reasonable that all efforts 
shall be made to have the minor children treated at a military 
installation if that is reasonable and practicable, 
8. That it is reasonable that the Separation Agreement 
and Supplemental Agreement be modified to provide that defendant 
have the minor children of the parties for the purposes of income 
tax deduction/exemption. 
9. That it is reasonable that the Separation Agreement 
and Supplemental Agreement be modified to provide that plaintiff 
not be allowed to record telephone conversations with the defendant 
or with the defendant and the children for any reason. 
10. That it is reasonable that the Separation Agreement 
and Supplemental Agreement be modified to provide the definition 
of "Reasonable Notice". 
11. Defendant has been required to retain an attorney 
to defendant himself against the allegations of the plaintiff in her 
Complaint which are without foundation and not brought in good 
faith thereby entitling defendant to attorney's fees, and further 
defendant is entitled to his costs and attorney's fees in bring-
ing this Counterclaim. 
WHEREFORE, defendant prays judgment against the defendant 
as follows: 
1. For relief consistent with the foregoing allegations; 
2. For attorney's fees and costs incurred herein; 
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3. For such other and further relief as this Court 
deems just. 
DATED , 1987. 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILED A TRUE & CORRECT copy of the foregoing to 
JAY FITT 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1327 South 800 East, Suite 100 
Orem, UT 84058 
postage prepaid, this \ \n day of January, 1987. 
\)_\e^— 
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Attorney for Plaintiff '*••• w ~ ' 
1325 South 800 East, Suite 100 
Crem, Utah 84058 
(801) 225-5550 V 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
— O O O O O O O — 
MARY C. BARTLETT, PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS 
TO THE RECOMMENDATION 
Plaintiff, OF THE COMMISSIONER 
vs. 
WILLIAM P. TROSS, 
Defencant. Civil No. CV-%k-^t>\ 
—oooOooo— 
Comes now tne plaintiff, nary C. Bartlett, and cojects to 
tne recommendation of the Domestic Relations Commissioner as 
contained in the supplemental order prepared by counsel for the 
defendant in the following particulars to wit: 
1. The plaintiff objects to the provisions set forth in 
paragraph 2. The defendant nas been responsible for failing to 
obtain a sale on that property, he has refused to keep the 
plaintiff informed, and he snould bear the entire responsibility 
of tne lose if any is sustained in the sale of the property. 
Further, the plaintiff is entitled to the use of tnat house, and 
is entitled to the rents there from. The provisions providing 
for tne defendant to make the mortgage payments, regarcles3 cf 
paragraph 4. That provision, as it is presently contained, would 
virtually give tne plaintiff no opportunity to be with the 
children curing the Christmas vacation. It would neitner allow 
ner an opportunity to help tnem prepare for visitation with the 
defendant or to prepare for tneir return to scnool following 
their visitation perioc. Furtner tne defendant exercised, during 
tne year 1986, tne majority of tne Christmas vacation as his 
visitation witn the children. It is reasonable tnat tne plain-
tiff be allowed to enjoy tne Christmas holiday, 1987, with tne 
children. 
3. The plaintiff objects to tne provisions contained in 
paragrapn 5 in that the order is un-enfcrceable, and is a 
violation of the separation of church anc State. Neither this 
court nor any other court has tne authority to maKe judgments 
regarding how churches shall conduct tneir business. 
4. The plaintiff objects to the provisions contained in 
paragraph 7 in that she is unemployed and unable, on her own, to 
obtain any kind of medical insurance for tne children. There nas 
been no change in circumstance which would alter tne requirement 
of tne defencant to make all expenditures for hospitalization 
and cental care. 
5. Tne plaintiff objects to tne provisions contained in 
paragrapn d in tnat she, witn tne assistance of ner nusbanc, 
llowarc Bartlett, pays over 57-' of tne total cost and expenses 
necessary for tne support of tne defendant's miner cnilcren. 
7. The plaintiff onjects cc the provisions contained in 
paragraph 11 in that the second sentence therein refers to two 
week visitations, and it was tne understanding of the plaintiff's 
counsel, that the defendant would have three of aGcitional 
periods of visitation upon two weeks notice, one of wnicn tne 
plaintiff could refuse if she nad other plans. 
Respectfully submitted this / U day of July, 1987 
xiJaW F111 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
O r\ 1 L' 1 i. ± 
Attcr.ney for Plaintiff 
1325 Soutn 800 East, Suite 100 
Oreik, U t a h 8 40 58 
( 3 0 1 ) 2 2 5 - 5 5 5 0 
:.!: ^ 0* 
MARY C. RARTLETT, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
•WILLIAM P . TROSS, 
Defendant. 
IH THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IK AMD FOR UTAH CCUKTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—cccOcoo— 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILIMG 
:ivn M.Q))'86>i3/o/ 
—oocOoco— 
Comes new Jay Fitt, ano certifies tnat a true ana accurate 
copy of the plaintiff's objections to the ccniiwissicner s recommen-
ced order were mailed to tne attorney for tne defendant, to wit, 
Frecerick A. Jackman, Esq., at 1327 SOU East, Suite 300, Ore-, 
Utah 84058, on tne 13th day of July, U'37. 
Datec this 13th day of July, 19b7\. 
FILED 
FOURTH JUDICIAL 9STOCT COURT 
Of- UWH UQUSTY STATE OF UTAJ* 
.OffUTT 
FREDERICK A. JACKMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
1327 South 800 East, Suite #300 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 225-1632 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY C. BARTLETT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM P. TROSS, 
Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
Civil No. CV 86 3101 
A Pre-trial Settlement Hearing was held on the 29th day of 
June, 1987, pursuant to notice given on the 19th day of February, 
1987, the Honorable Commissioner Howard H. Maetani presiding. The 
plaintiff appeared by and through her attorney, Jay Fitt. The 
defendant appeared in person and was represented by his attorney, 
Frederick A. Jackman. The parties having proffered their 
testimony through counsel and the Court having heard argument of 
counsel, having reviewed the file in this matter, and being 
otherwise fully advised in the premises, now, therefore, upon the 
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recommendation of the Honorable Court Commissioner, which 
recommendation was accepted by the parties, by and through their 
attorneys, and for good appearing, the following Supplemental 
Order is hereby issued. 
1. That the Decree of Dissolution entered in this case in 
the Common Pleas Court of Green County, Ohio, Division of 
Domestic Relations; the Separation Agreement dated the 10th day 
of October, 1984, and the Supplemental Agreement dated the 11th 
day of November, 1984, are hereby made a part of this file and 
are entitled to full faith and credit under the laws of the 
United States and the State of Utah. 
2. That this Supplemental Order shall amend and supplement 
the provisions of the Decree, the Separation Agreement, and 
Supplemental Agreement. To the extent the provisions of this 
Order contradict any of the terms of the Decree, Separation 
Agreement, or Supplemental Order, then the terms of this Order 
shall govern. To the extent that the terms of this Order do not 
contradict the Decree, Separation Agreement, or Supplemental 
Agreement, then those terms are hereby affirmed. 
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3. That the real property located in Ohio be listed for 
sale. The defendant shall be responsible for the payment of the 
mortgage on the property and in the event the property is rented, 
the rent shall be first applied to the mortgage payment. Any 
deficiency shall be born soley by the defendant. After sale, the 
net proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally between the 
parties and should there be a deficiency between the amount of 
the mortgage and the net proceeds of the sale, then such 
deficiency shall be paid equally by the parties. 
4. That the parties shall alternate the period each year 
during the childrenTs Christmas Vacation from 5:00 p.m. on the 
day the Christmas vacation begins until 9:00 p.m. on the day 
before the Christmas vacation ends beginning with the husband 
having custody of the children during the Christmas vacation for 
1987. 
5. That William P. Tross shall be entitled to perform all of 
the church ordinances having to do with the children as provided 
by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints including but 
not limited to the baptism of each child, the confirmation of 
each child, the ordination of the priesthood of each child, and 
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any and all other ecclesiastical ordinances. 
6, That both parties are restrained from interfering from 
the visitation of the other party or from the other party's 
relationship with the children. Both parties are further ordered 
to take all steps necessary to restrain third parties, such as 
spouses, from criticizing the parents of the children, and 
preventing them from contacting or harassing the other parent in 
and on behalf of the other parent or children. It is the intent 
of this Order to provide that discussions about the children and 
the relationship of the natural parents of the children to the 
children be handled between the parents without the interference 
of third parties. 
7. It is reasonable that both parties maintain medical, 
hospitalization/dental insurance on the minor children of the 
parties if said insurance is reasonably available to them and 
that they otherwise split equally any amounts not covered by 
insurance. It is further ordered that all efforts shall be made 
to have the minor children treated at a military installation to 
take advantage of the natural father's military benefits if at 
all possible. 
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8. It is ordered that the defendant have the minor children 
of the parties for the purpose of income tax deductions or 
exemptions. 
9. It is ordered that neither party record telephone 
conversations with the party or with the children of the parties 
for any reason. 
10. With regard to child support, so long as the defendant 
is paying the child support through his military alotment, then 
he shall determine the total amount of child support due for the 
year, divide that number by 12, and that shall be the amount of 
the alotment. The defendant shall not cancel the alotment during 
the summer visitation during which time the child support would 
normally abate but shall pay the reduced alotment on a monthly 
basis. 
11. It is ordered that the defendant may have additional 
visitation with the children not more than three times during 
each calendar year by giving the plaintiff at least two weeks 
notice of his intent to visit. Both parties shall cooperate with 
each other to facilitate this visitation and during one of the 
-twi> week visitations the defendant shall have the absolute right 
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to visit. 
12. Both parties are hereby ordered to submit affidavits on 
attorney's fees within ten days for further consideration by the 
Court. 
DATED this &(? day of J ^ ^ 1 9 8 7 
RECOMMENDED BY: 
)MESTIC COURT COMMISSIONER 
'BY: ^ 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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from 10:00 a.m. on the day after Christmas vacation begins until 
9:00 p.m. on the day preceding the day that Christmas vacation 
ends. 
4. As it relates to paragraph 5, defendant shall be 
notified of important events in the lives of the parties 
children, and defendant shall have preference over anyone else to 
perform church ordinances since he is the natural father, unless 
it is contrary to religious policy of the church. 
5. As it relates to paragraph 8 of the supplemental 
order, defendant shall have the minor children of the parties for 
the purpose of income tax deductions or exemptions as long as 
defendant is responsible for the mortgage payment on the Ohio 
home as set out in paragraph 3, and defendant is current on his 
child support obligation for the year in question. 
6. As it relates to paragraph 11, defendant may have 
additional visitation with the children on not more than three 
occasions during each calendar year by giving the plaintiff at 
least two (2) weeks notice of his intent to visit. Both parties 
shall cooperate with each other to facilitate this visitation and 
plaintiff shall have the right to deny visitation on one occasion 
each year if plaintiff has made prior arrangements for the 
children, or the visitation is inconvenient. 
7. All other paragraphs in defendant's supplemental 
order which were not objected to shall be included in the order. 
ocaIM 'M-/' 
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Attorney for Plaintiff 
1325 South 800 East, Suite 100 
Orem, Utah 84058 
(801) 225-5550 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
— 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 — 




WILLIAM P. TROSS, 
Defendant. Civil No. 
—oooOooo— 
Comes now the plaintiff, Mary C. Bartlett, and objects to 
the recommendation of the Domestic Relations Commissioner as 
contained in his recommendation dated the 22nd day of September, 
1987, for the reasons stated in her objection to the recommenda-
tion of the Commissioner as contained in the supplement order 
prepared by the counsel for the defendant which was submitted to 
the court in July, 1987. 
The plaintiff requests that a hearing be set before a judge 
of the Fourth Judicial District Court that tne matter may be 
heard in its entirety. 
Respectfully submitted th IS ^ \ G ay of September, 1987 
Jay-fitt 
Attorney for "Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the above 
and foregoing was sent postage prepaid this ^ \ day of 
September, 1987, to: 
Frederick A, Jackman, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
1327 South 800 East 
Orem, Utah 84058 
0
 rn 2- Si 
In the Fourth Judicial Distr icted ' ^ 
of the State of Utah 
In and For Utah County 
MINUTE ENTRY 
MARY C. BARRETT PWnttff 
CASE NUMBER CV 86 3101 
DATED O c t o b e r 6 , 1 9 8 7 
WILLIAM P . TROSS Defendant 1 BOYD L . P A R K JUDGE 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that this matter will come before 
the Court for hearing on the Objections to the Recommendation of the 
Domestic Relations Commissioner on November 16, 1987 at 1:30 p.m. 
This is a second setting, only. 
Dated this 6th day of October, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: -
• - " " . ' • . . • • . . . , • - - - ~ y 
BOYD L. PARK, OUDGE 
I certify that I mailed true copies of the foregoing postage 
pre-paid, on the 6th day of October, 1987 to the following: 
Oay Fitt, 1325 S. 800 E. #100, Orem, UT 84058 
Frederick A. dackman, 1327 S. 800 E., Orem, UT 84058 
WILLIAM F. HUISH, CLERK 
u^CZ^t^p^z^l^i BY^C^Z 
CV Ui~:-
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY 
MARY C. BARTLETT, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
WILLIAM P. TROSS, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER: CV 86 3101 
DATE: November 16, 1987 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
Rptd. Richard C. Tatton, CSR 
HEARING ON OBJECTION TO DRC RECOMMENDATION 
This matter came before the Court on plaintiff's 
objection to the Domestric Relations Commissioner's 
Recommendation. Plaintiff was present with counsel, Jay Fitt. 
Defendant was present with counsel, Frederick A. Jackman. 
The Court met with counsel in chambers and will not 
require opening statements. 
Mary C. Bartlett was sworn and testified in her own 
behalf on direct by Mr. Fitt. 
Counsel and the Court reviewed the Supplemental Order 
entered August 6, 1987, of which, was addressed in the 
recommendation of the DRC. 
The Court ordered that paragraph no. 9 of the 
Supplemental Order remain the same. In said order, the Court 
ordered that paragraph no. 11 remain the same and in an effort to 
help in scheduling visitation, that the plaintiff also advise the 
defendant in advance regarding the major plans of her family. 
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TERRI C, BINGHAM - 4540 
WATSON, SEILER & OREHOSKI 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2696 N, University Ave. 
Suite 220 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-5600 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY C. BARTLETT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM R. TROSS, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Civil No. CV-86-3101 
Commissioner Maetani 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Mary C. Bartlett by and 
through her attorney, Terri C. Bingham of Watson, Seiler & 
Orehoski and moves the above-entitled Court to reopen the above-
entitled case for the reason and basis that follows: 
1. That the verdict or decision as rendered by the 
Court is against the law, or in the alternative, is in error in 
law. 
2. That there was material evidence not introduced at 
trial, as a result of inadequate representation by Plaintiff's 
attorney and it is in the interest of justice that the Court 











3. This motion is supported by the accompanying 
Affidavit and Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays she be granted a new trial 
and that she be awarded her court costs and attorney's fees in 
bringing this matter before the Court. 
DATED this Q O day of December, 1987. 
WATSON, SEILER & OREHOSKI 
12|| TERRI C. BINGHAM 


















I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, to the following 
this J£_ day of December, 1987: 
Fredrick Jackman 
1327 South 800 East 
Suite 300 
Orem, UT 84058 
SECRETARY 
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TERRI C. BINGHAM - 4540 
WATSON, SEILER & OREHOSKI 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2696 N. University Ave. 
Suite 220 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (301) 375-5600 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY C. BARTLETT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM R. TROSS, 
.Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Civil No. CV-86-3101 
Commissioner Maetani 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Mary C. Bartlett, by and 
through her attorney, Terri C. Bingham of Watson, Seiler & 
Orehoski and submits the following Memorandum in support of her 
Motion for New Trial in compliance with Rule 59 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL 
ON THE BASIS THAT THE COURT'S DECISION 
REGARDING FEDERAL INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS 
IS AGAINST THE LAW OR IN ERROR OF LAW. 
On Novemebr 16, 1987, Judge Boyd Park of the Fourth 




4 I arguments from both parties regarding the unresolved issues 
5 between the parties in the above-entitled matter. In 
g Defendant's pleadings and the subsequent hearings. Defendant 
7 alleged that he should be entitled to the dependents exemption 
g for federal and state income tax purposes for the minor children 
9 of the parties. Counsel for the Defendant argued in Defendant's 
20 Response to Plaintiff's Objection to the recommendation of the 
22 Commissioner that the Decree of Divorce came into affect prior 
22 to the 1985-1986 Tax Reform Act and therefore the parties could 
23 determine in the pleadings where the income tax allocations 
24 should be distributed. (See paragraph 6 of Defendant's Response 
25 to Plaintiff's Objection to the Recommendation of the 
2g Commissioner.) In addition, Defendant argued at the November 
27 16f 1987 Trial that the contributions made by Plaintiff's 
2g spouse to the support of the children could not be used in 
29 determining who should receive the federal income tax 
20 exemptions. Said representations of the federal law regarding 
21 the allocation of income tax deductions for minor children of 
22 divorced parents is in error. 
11 
23 The Supplemental Agreement heretofore executed between 
24 the parties on the 14th day of November, 1984 specifically 
25 states in paragraph 4: 
26 "Concerning tax exemptions, the husband shall 
be entitled to claim all of the minor children on 
27 his federal, state and city income tax returns for 





4 1985f and thereafter, the rules promulgated by the 
Internal Revenue Service shall apply in making such 
5 determination(s)." 
g Therefore, by agreement of the parties and subsequent 
7 order of the Court, the parties are bound by the continuing 
g promulgation of rules regarding dependents exemptions as enacted 
g in the Internal Revenue Code, 
JO 26 Internal Revenue Code Section 152(e) provides that 
jl the custodial parent is entitled to the dependency exemptions 
12 i f : 
23 "(A) A child (as defined in Section 151(c)(3)) 
receives over half of his support during the calen-
24 dar year from his parents - (1) who are divorced or 
legally separated under a decree of divorce or sep-
25 arate maintenance, (2) who are separated under a 
written separation agreement, or (3) who live apart 
26 at all times during the last 6 months of the calen-
dar year, and 
27 (B) Such child is in the custody of one or 
both of his parents for more than one-half of the 
23 calendar year, such child shall be treated for pur-
poses of subsection (a) as receiving over half of 
29 his support during the calendar year from the par-
ent having custody for a greater portion of the 
20 calendar year (hereinafter in this subsection re-









Since Plaintiff is custodial parent and has the 
children with her more than three-fourths (3/4) of the calendar 
year, she should be entitled pursuant to agreement of the 
parties and the Internal Revenue Code to the dependency 
exemption for the minor children of the parties. Defendant has 
failed to show that there would be any material change of 





4 I dependency exemption subsequent to the November, 1984 agreement 
5 of the parties, 
g In addition, 26 Internal Revenue Code Section 
7 152(e)(5) specifically states: 
g "For purposes of this subsection, in the 
case of the remarriage of a parent, support of 
gll a child received from the parent's spouse shall 
be treated as received from the parent." 
Wherefore, even if there were a proper basis for the 
Court to reopen the issue of dependency exemptions for purposes 
of federal income taxes, the Court should consider the support 
contributions made in behalf of Plaintiff's new spouse for the 
minor children of the parties of this lawsuit. 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows 











"(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to 
29JI justify the verdict or other decision, or that 
it is against law, 
20iI (7) Error in law." 
21 Plaintiff contends that it would be in the best 
22 interest of justice to reopen this matter for resolution of the 
23 issues existing between the parties pursuant to correct 





II. PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL 
IN THAT THERE WAS MATERIAL EVIDENCE NOT 
INTRODUCED AT TRIAL, INADEQUATE REPRESENTA-
TION BY PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY, AND IN THE 
INTEREST OF JUSTICE, THE COURT SHOULD HEAR 
SAID EVIDENCE. 
Pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Court may grant a new trial based on negligence 
of a parties' counsel under "exigent or exceptional 
circumstances which appear to have resulted in an injustice.1* 
Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912 (Utah, 1982). 
On November 16, 1987, the Court heard arguments from 
both parties regarding the unresolved issues between the 
parties. There was material evidence which was not introduced 
at trial. 
In regard to summer visitation, no evidence was 
introduced at trial regarding the affect on the minor children 
of being uprooted for three months from their family and 
friends in Utah and being sent to California where they spend 
the entire summer with a babysitter or in a day camp while their 
father is at work. 
In regard to religious ordinances, no evidence was 
introduced at trial regarding the affect on the minor children 
of having the Court instead of the child determine who will 
perform religious ordinances on behalf of the child. In 
addition, no evidence was introduced at trial regarding the 





4 I relates to the child's freedom of choice versus the court 
5 mandate that the father will perform the religious ordinances. 
6 In regard to Christmas visitation, no evidence was 
7 introduced at trial regarding the affect on the children of the 
3 extended vacation which concludes approximately 11 hours before 
g the children are required to attend school again. 
10 In regard to medical and dental insurance, no evidence 
H was introduced regarding Champus coverage or the hardship on the 
12 Plaintiff of commuting over 160 miles to obtain health coverage 
13 at Hill Air Force Base, 
14 With regard to federal income tax dependency 
15 exemptions, Plaintiff was unable to present the Court with 
16 evidence regarding the amount of support given to the children 
17 by her present spouse. That evidence, coupled with the correct 
18 interpretation of the federal income tax laws would have allowed 
19 Plaintiff a high probability of success in having the federal 
20 income tax exemptions awarded to her. 
21 The exclusion of said evidence from the trial in this 
22 matter has resulted in injustice to both the Plaintiff and the 
23 minor children of the parties. 
24 WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that 
25 the Court grant a new trial wherein all relevant law and 
26 evidence may be presented for a proper, equitable and just 




4 DATED this ^ frfday of December, 1987. 
5 WATSON, SEILER & OREHOSKI 
61 
7 . 
TERRI C. BINGHAM 





















TJIM^ O B W W > 4 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, to the following 
this ,>ffictay of December, 1987: 
Fredrick Jackman 
1327 South 800 East 
Suite 300 
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A.Li. 
TERRI C. BINGHAM - 4540 
WATSON, SEILER & OREHOSKI 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2696 N. University Ave, 
Suite 220 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-5600 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARY C. BARTLETT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM R. TROSS, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
MARY C. BARTLETT 
Civil No. CV-86-3101 
Commissioner Maetani 
COMES NOW the Affiant, Mary C. Bartlett, and after 
having first been duly sworn upon her oath does depose and say 
as follows: 
1. That I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled 
matter. 
2. On November 16, 1987, a trial was held where 
evidence was presented by both parties in the above-entitled 
matter. 
3. That your Affiant does not believe that material 
evidence was introduced to the Court by her attorney. 





























was introduced at trial regarding the affect on the minor 
children of being uprooted for three (3) months from their 
family and friends in Utah and being sent to California where 
they spent the entire summer with a babysitter or in a daycamp 
while their father is at work. 
5. That no evidence was introduced at trial regarding 
the affect on the minor children of having the Court instead of 
the child decide who will perform religious ordinances on their 
behalf. 
6. In regard to religious ordinances, no evidence was 
introduced at trial regarding the policy of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints as it relates to the child's freedom 
of choice.versus the Court mandate that the . father will perform 
the religious ordinances. 
7. That in regard to medical and dental insurance, no 
evidence was introduced regarding Champus coverage or the 
hardship on the Plaintiff of commuting approximately 160 miles 
to obtain health care at Hill Air Force Base for the minor 
children. 
8. A Supplemental Agreement has heretofore been 
entered into by the parties on the 14th day of November, 1984, 
allowing Defendant to claim the income tax exemptions for the 
minor children of the parties for the calendar year 1984, and 






















Revenue Service shall apply in making such determinations." 
9. That your Affiant believes that she provides 
approximately sixty-five percent (65%) of the support of each of 
the minor children of the parties and should be entitled to the 
dependency exemption for the purposes of federal and state 
income taxes. 
10. That your Affiant is currently earning no income; 
however, your Affiant's spouse has contributed significant 
amounts to the support of the minor children of the parties to 
this lawsuit. 
DATED this 26y~aay of December, 1987. 
#%«, /V£,,^fe^-
•tg MARY/CC BARTLETT 
Affiant 





2111 NOTARY PUBLIC 
22 My Commission Expires: Residing At: 
&(i/«& (jU^Jor^U 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, to the following 
this 3ft day of December, 1987: 
Fredrick Jackman 
1327 South 800 East 
Suite 300 
Orem, UT 84058 
SECRETARY 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH COUNTY 
MARY C. BARTLETT, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
WILLIAM P. TROSS, 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER: CV 86 3101 
DATE: JUNE 29, 1988 
BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
R U L I N G 
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff's Motion 
for New Trial submitted in accordance with Rule 2.8 of the Rules 
of Practice of the District Courts. The Court has read 
plaintiff's Motion, Memorandum in Support of Motion for New 
Trial, Affidavit of the plaintiff and plaintiff's Reply to 
defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Opposition to 
Motion for New Trial. The Court has read defendant's Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities In Opposition to Motion For New Trial, 
and being fully advised in the premises makes the following 
Ruling: 
Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial is denied. 
Dated a t P rovo , Utah thi$~-2r9^pt^day of J u n g , 1988 
JOYS'L. PARlO, DISTRICT JUDGE 
c c : T e r r i C. Bingham, Esq . 
F r e d e r i c k A. Jackman, Esq. 
J»ynr TERRI C. BINGHAM - 4540 
WATSON & SEILER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2696 N. University Ave. 
Suite 22 0 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-5600 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
U MARY C. BARTLETT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILLIAM P. TROSS, 
Defendants-
NOTICE OF APPEA: 
Civil No. CV86-3101 
(Judge Boyd L. Park) 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Mary C. Bartlett, by and through 
her attorney of record, Terri C. Bingham of Watson & Seiler, 
and hereby gives notice of her appeal to the Court of Appeals, 
State of Utah, from a decision rendered by Judge Boyd L. Park 
in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of 
Utah, Case No. CV86-3101. Said decision was rendered on June 
29, 1988 by Judge Park and was filed in the Office of the Clerk 
thereof that same day. Plaintiff does hereby appeal from the 
whole of said decision. 
DATED this at^ day of July, 1988. 
!\ 
Hrl^l^ fo\r/^J*&/Yy^ 
TERRI C. BINGHAM O 



























IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
O o 
MARY C. BARTLETT 





WILLIAM P. TROSS 
rss 
~ ^ 
Civil No. CV-86-3101 
HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
Defendant. 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on Monday, the 16th day of 
November 1987 the HEARING in the above^entitled matter was 
taken by Richard C. Tatton a Certified Shorthand Reporter and 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah before the Honorable 
Boyd L. Park at the Utah County Courthouse, Provo, Utah 8460H 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: Mr. Jay Fitt 
Attorney at Law 
Orem, Utah 
For the Defendant: Mr. Rick Jackman 
Attorney at Law 
Orem, Utah 
P R' 0 C E E D I N G S> 
THE COURT: This is the time set for the hearing 
of Mary C. Bartlett vs. William P. Tross and this is a 
domestic relations matter here on appeal from Commissioner 
Maetani's Court.Mr. Fitt are you ready? 
MR. FITT: Yes Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Jackman are you ready? 
MR. JACKMAN: Yes sir. 
THE COURT: Mr. Fitt it is your appeal you may 
proceed. The record may show that the court has met with 
counsel in chambers and it wonrt be necessary to give me 
an opening statement I am oriented with the case already 
by reason of our meeting. Allright Mr. Fitt you may 
2 
proceed? 
MR. FITT: We would call Mrs. Bartlett. 
THE COURT: Mrs. Bartlett come forward and be 
sworn and take the witness stand. 
MARY C. BARTLETT 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the Plaintiff being 
first duly sworn was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. FITT: 
Q State your name and address for the record please? 
A Mary Christine Bartlett. I live at 847 East 
1400 South in Orem, Utah. 
Q And you petitioned you filed an action in this 
court to make an Ohio Judgment the judgment of this 
court have you not? 
A Yes. 
Q Following a hearing before Commissioner Maetani a 
proposed order was submitted and I reviewed that with 
you do you recall that? 
A Yes. 
Q The first provision in that was the Decree of 
Dissolution of the case in Green County, Ohio be made a 




Q That order includes a Decree and also a supplemental 
order based upon supplemental agreements. 
Now with regard to real property that exists 
in the State of Ohio will you tell the court how that 
property was acquired please? 
A We jointly bought the property to serve as residence 
for us. I do not remember the exact date of when we 
purchased the property it was approximately a year and 
a half two years before our divorce. 
Q Did you obtain , did you utilize any benefits that 
you had under the administration to purchase it? 
A Yes I did. Mr. Tross did not have enough benefits 
available to him because they were tied up in another 
house down in Tuscon,Arizona at the time and therefore 
it was necessary to use my V.A. Benefits to buy the house. 
Q You had no obligation on that Tuscon house? 
A I don't believe my benefits were used there no. 
Q Were you signed on the dotted line with regard to 
that house at all? 
A Jointly owned I believe. 
Q Do you know what has happened to that house? 
A I have no idea. 
Q Now at the time of the divorce were you occupying 
that house? 
A In Fairborne? 
Q Yes. 
A Yes. 
Q And how soon after the divorce did you leave? 
A I ended up leaving approximately I think it was about 
two and a half weeks after the divorce. I originally 
was going to be there for another six months but I got an 
opportunity to come out to school early so I did. 
Q Did you tell Mr. Tross about your leaving? 
A Yes he knew. 
Q And did you leave him in charge of the house then? 
A He requested when we finished with the divorce 
proceedings if he could be allowed to live in the house and 
keep it up and put it on the market for sale so that he would nj^t 
have to pay rent elsewhere and I agreed to it. 
Q Just a friendly aside agreement? 
A Just an aside agreement. 
Q Do you know whether it was put on the market? 
A The first indication that I had that it was actually 
put on the market was notification that I received from Mr. 
Baldwin who was the realtor in charge and I think that was 
around May of 1985. It should have been put on the market 
right away but that was the first indication that it actually 
had been. 
Q Do you know what price was being asked for it at the 
time? 
D 
A It seems like it was close to $79,000.00 and 
I remember it being an extremely high price and I told 
Bro. Baldwin or Mr. Baldwin that I did not agree 
to the price it was way to high for the property in 
the area and he informed me that is the price Mr. Tro.ss 
had agreed to and signed to. 
Q Now you have attempted to contact other realtors 
that Mr. Tross has used is that correct? 
A Yes when I found out who they were yes. 
Q Have you done anything to interfere with any sales 
that might have been proposed or pending? 
A No I have never been contacted by any pending sales. 
Q Did you refuse at anytime to approve a sale? 
A No I did not. 
Q To your understanding what was the mortgage 
balance at the time what is it now if you don't know what it) 
was then? 
A I think it is in the neighborhood of $68,000.00 
I donrt know the exact amount. 
Q You are not an expert as far as real property values 
are or what the market might be so you don't know whether 
or not even $68,000.00 would be a price that he had? 
A I don't know I have all I could go by is appraisals 
done by various realtors. 
Q When did you first learn that Mr. Tross had stopped 
6 
1 making the payments on the house? 
2 I A It was approximately three weeks ago. I received 
3 a telegram a mailgram in my mail box for me to contact a 
4 number at the Veteran's Administration immediately. I 
5 went in the house and phoned the number and I was told 
6 that at that time that the property would be foreclosed 
7 in about a month which would have made it the end of 
g November of this year and that Mr. Tross was behind in hi 
9 payments, four payments at that time, 
10 Q N o w a r e y°u do you have any objection to signing 
11 a deed in lieu of foreclosure in order to get rid 
12 of the property and get rid of the obligation? 
13 A To the best understanding that I have of what a 
14 deed in lieu is no not at this time. 
15 Q You are not willing to do that? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q But if the deed in lieu is not acceptable then 
18 you feel that Mr. Tross should be ordered to pay any 
19 deficiencies that might come up? 
20 A Yes I do. 
21 Q Now in paragraph four deals with visitation 
22 that is Christmas visitation specifically it is your 
23 position that that alternating Christmas vacation is 
24 appropriate but would like to have the children picked up 
25 by Mr.Tross on the day following the day that they are 
1 released from school rather than that afternoon? 
2 A Yes that will give me time to get them packed 
3 and things settled so that they can leave, 
4 Q You would also like to have them returned on the 31st 
5 of December? 
6 A Yes. 
7 Q And what are your reasons for that please? 
8 A One reason is that the school year varies as far 
9 as vacation days form year to year. There are some 
10 years where they have to return to school the 2nd 
11 of January . There is some years where it is a couple of da>f 
12 later. I have found in the past that the children tend 
13 to need a couple of days to settle down and get back into 
14 their routine before they get back into school. 
15 I have come to that conclusion partly by the their 
16 behavior at home when they first return and also because 
17 of various teachers calling me in for conferences soon 
18 after the visitation time and informing me that the kids 
19 were not ready to settle down and do work when they came 
20 back. 
21 Q Other than those provisions you agree with Christmas 
22 visitation? 
23 A Yes I have no problem with that. 
24 Q You would like to exercise your Christmas visitation 
25 this year though because he had it last year? 
A Yes I would like to have them this year. 
Q Now with regard to summer visitation the provisions 
in the Ohio Decree are what you are willing to abide by 
do you have some concerns about the children willing to 
participate in organized activities like sports and I 
have explained to you what the court's position is on that arj 
that so you understand you will abide by that I guess? 
A I understand I may have to but I would like to comment} 
that the only reason I agreed to that in the first place 
is that Mr. Tross assured me in the presence of my attorney 
that if the children decided that they wanted to participate 
in summer sports during the month of June or other June 
activities that he would not stand in their way and would 
allow them to do so. I took him at his word and agreed 
to the summer visitation since then I have had at least one 
child every year desire to participate in summer sports and 
each year they have been denied because Mr. Tross is not 
willing to work with the children on that. 
Q But that as far as you understand from the court's 
position is going to be between him and them and you are 
not to interfere and you are willing to accept that then? 
A Yes. 
Q Paragraph 7 of the proposed order deals with medical 
and dental and hospitalization insurance where are you 
presently employed if you are? 
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A I am not employed. 
Q What do you do? 
A I am a student finishing up my Bachelor's 
Degree at Brigham Young University. ~~ 
Q How soon will that become finished? 
A I will receive my Bachelor's Degree in April of 
this next year of 1988 yes. 
Q So you are not gainfully employed? 
A No not at the current time. 
Q You have no ability to provide medical and 
hospitalization insurance? 
A No sir. 
Q I have just handed you something are those notes 
that you prepared by yourself? (indicating) 
A Yes. 
Q And those are calculations that you have made based 
upon your own records at home? 
A Yes. 
Q Now paragraph 8 provided that the defendant should 
have the minor children of the parties for the purpose of 
Income Tax deductions for exemptions and you object to that 
what portion of the support of the children do you pay or 
has been paid from your resources? 
A According to my last couple of years records which 
is - -
10 
MR. JACKMAN: I object Your Honor the records 
have not been introduced into evidence. I haven't even 
seen them. She is now testifying to them without foundation, 
I think the last couple of years is too broad and the 
categories. 
THE WITNESS: I can give them to you if you would 
like? 
MR. JACKMAN: That is my objection. 
THE CORUT: Lay some foundation Mr. Fitt if she 
is going to testify from that. 
BY MR. FITT: 
Q When did you prepare that document? 
A When did I prepare this? 
Q Yes. 
A I prepared it in originally, oh, I prepared the 
financial statement as to what was paid and how much for the 
past year in June of this year for the original hearing 
which we had in June. 
Q That is on the court's own form? 
A Yes and I took the information home at your request 
and went back over it to see if adjustments were needed 
and I found it to be correct as far as my records are 
concerned. 
Q Now have you itemized then the portion of expenses 
that pertain to the children, how many people live in your 
11 
'-toehold? 
A There are eight of us. 
^ And how many persons are involved as far as Mr. 
— v ^ s is concerned? 
A Five. 
Q Three and those three are whom that are not included? 
m i A Myself , my husband and his son he has a 14 year old 
I j s t - that lives with us. 
m i C All right now will you tell the court how you arrived 
a
~ these computations without telling him what they are? 
A I have always kept very careful financial records 
^—yti.Tie I pay a bill what the bills are and what I did 
t- I took the last years worth of payments on expenses that 
--solved the children in anyway whether it be you know housirj 
tcsoo% clothing, sports, scouting activities, school 
s ctivites, and so forth. What I did was I added up the 
a r
°-nt that had been spent over the last year in each categorj 
separately. Those that involved only the children I left 
a s
 they were and divided the amount by 12 to indicate 
ncv much was spent over the period of a year. Those that 
^•-
vo!ved also the 14 year old'myself or my husband I divided 
- took out the portion of expenses that involved my husband cj 
—y^^lf or the 14 year old leaving only that proportion which 
involved only the children and then again divided that by 12. 




















Q What is on the top of your list as far as expenses 
are concerned? 
MR. JACKMAN: I will object again Your Honor it 
assumes facts that are not in evidence. It is a summary 
apparently some other records and again I haven't seen it 
I don't have a copy of it and I don't know what she is talkirjg 
about and she is about to testify to. 
MR. FITT: Your Honor he can cross examine and 
unless you want her to bring in each and every bill? 
THE COURT: Well haven't you got copies for Mr. 
Jackman? 
MR. FITT: I met with her on Friday and asked 
her to prepare it on her own. I will hand it to Mr. Jackman 
if he would like to look at it before she testifies to it? 
THE COURT: Let him look at it before she testifies 
from it. (indicating) 
MR. JACKMAN: There aren't even categories on 
it and it just says this amount and this is what it costs. 
MR. FITT: Look at page three and four and five 
and on if you would like to look at it. 
MR. JACKMAN: I object Your Honor it is a summary 
of I don't know what the categories are she says that I 
looked at all these things I decided which were important 
13 
and I decided which ones were important, I added them up 
and decided if they were right. If she was given a statement) 
on Friday and was compiled it over the weekend we could 
have seen it. I could have seen the checks or whatever 
she compiled it from and they could have been entered 
into evidence. That summary assumes facts not in evidence 
and that is the very foundation and basis for it. I have 
no way to cross examine that, no way at all. 
THE COURT: I think that is accurate Mr. Fitt how 
is he going to cross examine unless he has some basic 
documents to examine himself to ask questions about. 
MR. FITT: Well I think we are delaing with a 
presumption then Your Honor that she does provide over 51 
per cent and unless he can - -
THE COURT: Where does that presumption come from? 
MR. FITT: I think the IRS has enunciated that. 
THE COURT: Exisiting law that makes a 
presumption in favor of the custodial parent but that 
doesn't create a presumption for me, just a presumption for 
tax purposes for the IRS. 
MR. FITT: Well the hearings that are conducted in thj 
court are some what different from the ones conducted in 
Commissioners Maetani's court and I would like to see some 




THE COURT: You don't have any surprise in this 
court this is a court of law, he is a commissioner. 
Whenever you come in here you have to know that you have to 
have some basic documents behind any summary. It is not 
limited to divorce actions or domestic relations matters 
but the court is bound by the same rules of civil procedure 
everytime we take the bench, 
MR. FITT: Well that hasn't been my experience 
even before Commissioner Maetani. 
THE COURT: Well that is not true with Commissioner 
Maetani, I am talking about this court or any District 
Court. 
MR. FITT: This court may but well I am not going 
to argue that with the court. 
BY MR. FITT: 
Q What is paid per month for housing? 
A The total housing bill is $284.50. 
Q And you have apportioned that 3/5 as it applies to you 
children by Mr. Tross? 
A Yes now that housing was until three months ago 
$279.50 so it recently has been raised $5.00 and that is 
not incorporated into this figure the raise. 
When I figured it I figured that the children's portion o 
the housing was $175.00 a month. 
Q What about your food expense what does it amount to in 
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a month? 
A Food expense for the eight of us I do not have the 
exact figure here. It ranges between $350.00 and $400.00 
a month depending on the month. 
Q And you have apportioned 5/8 of that to your children 
then? 
A And the food and household supplies which includes 
cleaning supplies and things of that nature their portion 
I came no $260.00. 
THE COURT: I object on the basis of materiality agsj 
there is really no foundation there is no way I can 
know what she is talking about if these are her conclusions. 
THE COURT: Well they are her guess right now. 
MR. JACKMAN: Yes and in that case I don't think 
it is material or bears great weight. 
THE COURT: Has about the same validity as 
the Financial Statements that they have that they hand 
in on these things don't they. 
I am not going to let that become a part of the evidence 
but I am going to let her testify if she has done some 
calculations on these things if it is a guess it is a guess 
and in that way we will have to treat it as such. 
BY MR. FITT: 
Q What calculations did you go through in order to 
reach the conclusions that have been drawn on your summary? 
in 
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A In the case of the housing the I took the monthly 
mortgage divided it by eight and the figure that came out 
I multiplied the figure that came out which was 1/8 of the 
mortgage payment times five to indicate the childrens' 
portion of it and that left three portions for myself 
and my husband and the 14 year old. 
Q And how did you arrive at your food and household 
expenses? 
A I took the amount from my checks that I have written 
for purchasing food for a month's period. I have 
averaged it over a year as to how much I spent because 
some months it does go a little higher than others. I 
divided . that once again I took the average for the month for] 
one month out of the year I divided that by eight and 
multiplied that 1/8 number by five to indicate the 
childrens' portion. 
Q These came straight out of your checkbook then? 
A Out of my checkbook and I have a ledger which I 
have been keeping for ten , eleven years or so to where 
I write down all the bills that have paper bills in them 
but food things such as food come out of my checkbook. 
Q Did you do the same thing with regard to heat and 
electricity and telephone this kind of things? 
A Yes I took the bills that I had received and paid for 
the last twelve months. I averaged the amounts since 
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1 utilities are much higher in the winter than they are in the 
2 spring and summer. I averaged it over the year and divided 
3 that average by twelve or divided the figure of the total 
4 year's bills by twelve to get an average for the year. I 
5 then divided that by eight and multiplied again the 1/8 
6 figure by five to indicate the children's portion. 
7 Q What other expenses did you take into consideration 
3 when you were doing this calculation? 
9 I A I took into consideration the cost of dry cleaning 
10 and purchasing laundry detergents for clothing. I took 
11 into consideration the amount of money that I spent on buyind 
12 clothing for them during that year. I took into consideratiq 
13 the medical payments as far as prescriptions and so forth 
14 which I took care of. There were a couple of childrens' 
15 physicals involved , several medications mostly over the 
16 counter drugs there were three or four prescription 
17 medications that I paid for and I have those receipts. 
18 I took into consideration how much money I paid for 
19 life insurance on the children each month. 
20 MR. JACKMAN: I will object to that that is not 
21 one of the appropriate expenses? 
22 THE COURT: Sustained. 
23
 THE WITNESS: I also took into consideration how 
2 4
 much money I have to pay for child care during each month 
" on the few times that I do do child care. 
TW 
MR. JACKMAN: Object to that. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
THE WITNESS: When I have to - -
THE COURT: Don't answer, the question has been 
sustained. 
MR. FITT: Go ahead. 
THE COURT: Well ask her another question. 
BY MR. FITT: 
Q What other? 
A Okay I also took into consideration the school 
expenses which I have to pay to the elementary school 
that the children attend. That incldues books, school 
supplies, that includes special requests by the teachers 
for funds to pay for field trips or other type of school 
activities which the children are required to pay for. 
I took into consideration what the family does their 
portion of what the family does for entertainment such - -
MR. JACKMAN: I object to that one Your Honor that 
is totally out, how do you say that one is not necessary but 
it is in a way but that is so discretionary it really 
shouldn't have a bearing on it. 
THE COURT: Not for this particular purpose it 
doesn't have a bearing sustained. 
THE WITNESS: I took into consideration the amount cj 
money that has been spent on birthday presents and Christmas 
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1 presents for the children? 
2 MR. JACKMAN: Object it is irrelevant.. 
3 THE COURT: I think for this purpose it maybe 
4 irrelevant because there is no consistency in it I don't 
5 know how much it leaves an end open to do whatever you want 
5 to do. I will sustain that objection. 
7 THE WITNESS: I also took into consideration the 
8 cost of gasoline to transport the children back and forth 
9 to their activities to school or to church activities. 
IQ MR. JACKMAN: Same objection on that one that 
U some of that maybe necessary some of it may not , activities 
12 maybe discretionary. Who is to say when they could have 
13 walked, who is to say it was a rainy day, it was too rainy 
14 it was not rainy enough it is just too open. 
15 THE COURT: Well I understand that but I will 
|g allow that objection overruled. 
17 THE WITNESS: I took into consideration the amount 
jg of money that I have to pay monthly on installment payments 
19 to pay off clothing that the children have required or 
20 other things that I have had to purchase for them such as 
21 furniture. 
22 MR. JACKMAN: I will object to that one that is a 
23 double deduction she can't take off for the cost of clothing 
24 on the one hand and take it off as a monthly installment 
25 as wel1. 
20 
1 THE WITNESS: There is clothing that I have paid 
2 cash for that I have check receipts for that is under the 
3 other clothing figure. The clothing that is on my 
4 installment is clothing and furniture and needs that the 
5 children have which were not covered under the other one 
6 which I have had to put on installments because I didn't 
7 have the money to pay cash for it at the time. 
8 THE COURT: As long as they are not duplicating 
9 I will allow it. 
I0 BY MR. FITT: 
H Q Do you understand which ones the court is are there 
12 any other expenses that you need to talk about? 
13 A I think that is basically about it. 
14 Q Now do you recall the ones that the court sustained 
15 the objection to? 
16 A Okay the court said that they would not allow the 
17 money that I paid for life insurance is that correct? 
18 Q Life insurance,no, child care, no,and also 
19 entertainment activities, no,is there any other? 
20 MR. JACKMAN: Well Your Honor if you take a look a 
21 that exhibit it is a monthly summary and I suppose what 
22 counsel is going to have her do now is have her estimate 
23 based on her estimate what she should take off from the 
24 estimate. This is compounding the inadequacy of that 
25 evidence. Again I don't have anyway to cross examine as to 
the other expenses or what they are or anyway to test 
her estimate that document just doesn't meet the best eviden4e 
test. 
THE COURT: There is no question about it that it 
doesn't meet the best evidence test but we ordinarily 
accept sworn statements in these matters as to their total 
expenses. I will allow her to continue to testify on this 
then we will apply the rule of reasons to it. 
BY MR. FITT: 
Q Now deducting the amounts that the court has 
excluded by sustaining the objections how. much do you spend 
on an average per month for the support of those five 
children? 
A Okay taking out the life insurance, the child care, ttj 
entertainment, they said that they would not accept money 
spent on birthday or Christmas presents and I believe 
the other one was transportation , auto expenses was the 
other one taking those out it comes to a little over 
$1,000.00. 
Q How much over a $1,000.00? 
A Approximately $200.00 a month per child. Right 
about a $1,000.00 if these estimates are correct. 
Q And over a period of twleve months what do you averag^ 
in receipts from Captain Tross for child support? 
THE COURT: $125.00 per child per month. 
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MR. FITT: That is over 10 months. 
THE WITNESS: Over a 12 month period - -
THE COURT: Well she doesn't have all these same 
expenses for two months. 
MR. JACKMAN: I was going to make that point Your 
Honor on cross examination that needs to be reduced by two 
months worth if we are going to compare apples and oranges. 
THE WITNESS: I did not count the months that I do 
not buy food for them and stuff in the summer. 
MR. JACKMAN: I maybe mistaken Your Honor I thought 
I heard her testify that she took an average month figured 
out something and divided it by twelve and multiplied it by 
eight and divided it by five . I had a hard time following 
but I got the impression that it was a 12 month period of 
time. 
THE WITNESS: I took the amount that I had spent 
on the children over a year's period. I divided that by 
twelve to get an idea of what it would be on a monthly 
basis. I did not divide it by nine months and twenty days 
because I did not count the two months and some odd days that} 
the children were not with me. 
THE COURT: Well - -
THE WITNESS: I was trying to get a figure to work 
with if they were there you know to go on a yearly basis. ItJ 
is much easier to work on a yearly basis then on a three 
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quarter or whatever basis. 
BY MR. FITT: 
Q But your yearly expenses average a little over 
$1,000.00 for the per month for all of the children? 
A Yes. 
Q And you receive on an average about $481.00 to $495.0C 
a month from Captain Tross is that right? 
A Up until iMay of this year I recieved $600.00 a month 
Q Yes but that would be averaged over the year though? 
A Yes averaged over a year $481.00 a month. 
Q Paragraph 9 orders neither party to record telephone 
conversations with the party with the children of the 
parties for any reason. Have you ever recorded 
conversations? 
A Yes I did. 
Q What was your purpose in doing that? 
A I had received several phone calls - -
MR. JACKMAN: I will object Your Honor is she 
claiming that she has a right to record conversations, I 
don't understand what the objection to it is? 
THE COURT: I don't either what are you claiming 
for this? 
MR. FITT: It is ordered that she not be able to 
that she not record telephone conversations. I don't belief 
that there is a requirement that she not be able to if she 
24 
wants to record them if she wants to record them. 
THE COURT: This violates somebody's rights 
without their permission. 
MR. JACKMAN: That is against the law she is 
recording a third party conversation. Her children and 
her ex husband she is not a party to the conversation 
that is a violation of the Privacy Act. 
MR. FITT: That is no more different than having 
a photographic memory and able to recount. 
THE COURT: I am not even going to quarrel 




The two conversations that I recorded 
I object she is not testifying - -
I recorded the conversation and 
I informed Mr. Tross that I was recording the conversation 
and he told me he has no problem with it. 
THE COURT: Paragraph 9 will remain as it is. 
I find that order will be the same. 
BY MR. FITT: 
Q Also paragraph 11 provides that the children be 
available to Captain Tross at three additional times 
during the calendar year providng he gives you at least 
two weeks notice, you have no objection to that you would 
just like to have the opportunity to be able to tell him that! 
you have another activity planned and you don't want to caned 1 
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just because of his visit and maybe do that once in a 
year only to perserve the integrity of your existing family 
is that right is that correct or what do you feel about 
that? 
A I feel that as long as we have no ohter plans there i^ 
no objection to his visiting at other times with the 
children but if a time he gives me happens to have a plan 
that we cannot change which has happened in the past then 
I do not feel that I should be forced to change our family 
or eliminate our family plans. I think we should have the 
right to continue with our family plans whenever possible, 
THE COURT: What is the purpose of the two weeks? 
MR. JACKMAN: Your Honor it was amazing how their 
plans became set in concrete as Mr. Tross tried to 
do his visitation. Occassionally he can be in the area at 
Hill Air^Force Base or passing through and what we are 
asking for - -
THE COURT: How far in advance does he know that? 
MR. JACKMAN: Sometimes not very long and 
sometimes as long as two or three weeks we will give as 
much notice as we can . The purpose of this was to say 
that look I will be in the area I will give you two weeks 
notification of when I am going to be in the area of the 
three at least you know three times I will be in the area 
I will give you as much notice as I can. On one of those 
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occasions you can veto me but on the other two I give you 
two weeks notice you make the kids available for me. The 
problem was for example he moved back from Ohio and he 
was passing through, an inconvenience you don't get visitatiorj 
THE WITNESS: He got visitation. 
THE COURT: You respond when you are asked a questicj 
and counsel will handle that and I don't want any argument 
in the court. 
MR. JACKMAN: That was the purpose for that visitation 
give her two weeks notice on other occasions other than 
specifically provided for we can't do every other holiday 
in the standard type of thing . There are going to be times 
during the year where he may get some leave time and a long 
weekend or will be a Hill Air Force Base give her two weeks 
notice we don't want her to say "no" that the kids have got 
baseball or "no" that we are going on a vacation, you know 
those kinds of things. We don't know which ones they are 
going to be and that is why it is left open. We would like 
to have three of those a year one of them she can say 
"no" for whatever reason she wants and the other two she 
needs to accommodate us. 
THE COURT: Mr. Fitt. 
BY MR. FITT: 
Q Do you understand my explanation to you what the court 
position is concerning the performance of church ordinances? 
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THE COURT: Well let's go back to this other 
thing and resolve it for just a minute if we can. Do you ha\| 
any comment with regard to this three additional visitations 
other than your client says that she doesnTt like it. 
She wants the right to veto all three that is what I 
understand? 
MR. FITT: No she doesn't want to be able to 
veto all three but and she wants to allow visitation. Her 
position is that the contact with Captain Tross has 
been such a traumatic experience the reason she recorded 
the telephone conversations was because of his yelling at 
her and she wanted to be able to prove to somebody 
that she is not telling a story. 
She would like to have the children have as complete 
an association with their father as they possibly can. 
THE COURT: Well I don't see any reason why she 
can't hang up the phone if he is being unreasonable. 
MR. FITT: Well that is what I have suggested that 
she do. 
THE COURT: But I don't think you ought to get 
yourself in some kind of a jack pot recording telephone 
conversations and find yourself in violation of the Federal 
Communications Law. 
Coming back to this other visitation thing how long 
do you generally have when these things happen, Mr. Jackman 
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how long does your client generally have in the area are 
we talking about a week, a day or what? 
MR. JACKMAN: Just a long weekend isn't it? 
MR. TROSS: You mean from the Hill Air Force 
things ? 
MR. JACKMAN: Well these three visitations how long 
would those visits be? 
MR. TROSS: A day, a few hours in the evening 
or maybe two evenings in a row or something like that. 
THE COURT: So we are not talking about long periods) 
MR. JACKMAN: No. 
THE COURT: Well I think it is reasonable the way it] 
sits then if we are talking about long periods and the only 
other thing that I can say is if you have something planned 
such as a family party or a vacation or something that is 
planned sometime during that period when he may appear 
and you know about that you could give me notice well in 
advance that you were going on this short vacation or you 
have this family reunion or whatever so that he can make 
his plans accordingly as well so this is not just a one way 
street on notice but that ought to be given well in advance 
otherwise I think paragraph 11 could remain the same. 
Okay go ahead and proceed Mr. Fitt. 
BY MR. FITT: 
Q How has your communications with Captain Tross occurred 
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in the past? 
A I am not sure I understand exactly what you are lookirjg 
for? 
Q Whether you had communication either by telephone or 
otherwise how has that usually accomplished I guess is what 
I am trying to ask you is how peaceable how pleasant are the 
communications? 
THE COURT: What are you getting at? 
MR. FITT: I am trying to give the court some 
understanding as to why there have been difficulties in the 
past. She wants to afford visitation but she doesn't 
want to be bullied. 
THE COUET: Well the order will take care of that I 
don't think that she has to be bullied by anybody . She 
can hang up the phone if he is bullying her. If he comes 
there when he is not supposed to be there he is a 
tresspasser. I don't think there is anything I can 
you have a Restraining Order in here don't you? (indicating)) 
MR. FITT: No I don't believe so. 
THE COURT: Is there something in there that 
is there something in here about take steps to restrain 
third parties and others both parties refrained from 
interfering with the visiation of the other party etc., etc. 
does that need to be expanded upon for restraining purposes? 
MR. JACKMAN: Number 6 is pretty broad? 
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THE COURT: That is what I thought Tt looked 
like it covered it. Preventing them from contacting 
harassing the other parent on behalf of the other parent 
or children. 
MR. FITT: Well the business about speaking ill 
of the opposing, the other, I guess opposing is a bad 
word they have been opposing each other too long and it needs) 
to stop. My client wants to stop it and she doesn't 
want to be pushed around. She doesn't want to be 
conciliatory and then pushed beyond the point. 
THE COURT: Well if you want to expand upon the 
Restraining Order to make it mutual in terms then I will allcjw 
that. 
MR. FITT: Well that would be acceptable but that 
is still a very difficult thing to enforce and it usually 
ends up being - -
THE COURT: I understand that, neither ffIM or 
anyone else will be out there with a shot gun to do it. 
BY MR. FITT: 
Q Now with regard to child support as it exists 
presently you are content to have the amount paid at the currjent 
rate that he is paying it that is $181.00, $481.00 per month?| 
A Yes that is fine. 
Q When the Divorce Decree was first entered in Ohio 




1 at the beginning of the month or the end of the month? 
2 A I do not remember the exact date in November that 
3 he gave me the money for the two weeks in November. He 
4 did bring cash in the first week of December for the month of| 
5 December. 
5 MR. JACKMAN: I object on the grounds that this 
7 is totally irrelevant and immaterial *nd I would proffer 
3 this we discussed this with regard to the time of keying 
9 in this allottment. If the anniversary of that supplemental 
10 agreement is November we would be willing to maintain 
11 the $600.00 payments to the anniversary less the two months 
that needed to be taken out and if we owe some different 
money on that and we will make it right. 
1 4 I MR. FITT: We calculated that to be about $377.00 
15 that includes the $80.00 which she did not , she says that 
]g she didn't receive any $80.00 for the month of June and 
17 didn't receive a check and consequently couldn't lose it. 
18 We don't dispute that Captain Tross may have sent it or 
19 thought he sent it and she never received it and it has 
20 never cleared so there is $377.00 owed and also I have 
21 explained to Mrs. Bartlett the circumstances of being a 
22 month late and she still feels that he was on time to begin 
23 with and he has used the excuse of the military allottment 
24 to be a month late and we feel like he ought to be ordered 
25 to pay the $600.00 that he is behind and make that current. 
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1 The child support that is due December 1, even thought it 
2 is from November's earnings will be paid in December 1 
3 and that is basically the way she would like to have it run. 
4 You may cross examine. 
5 THE COURT: The original Decree calls for payment or] 
6 the 1st day of each month? 
7 MR. JACKMAN: Your Honor I would refer the court to 
8 article 4 , paragraph 2 of the supplemental agreement and 
9 it says that the husband shall pay for child support the sum 
10 of $120.00 per month per child and said payment shall be 
11 paid on a bimonthly basis and it shall be paid by the 
12 military allottment. We would submit that it says by militar] 
13 allottment therefore however, the military allotts it is 
14 the way it is paid. 
15 THE COURT: Paid on a once a month basis right 
16 now isn f t it? 
17 MR. JACKMAN: Well it is deducted from his 
18 check twice a month. 
19 THE COURT: But they remit it right? 
20 MR. JACKMAN: Right and that is the military 
21 allottment and I submit that is what the separation agreement] 
22 says. 
23 THE COURT: So the fact that it calls for a bimonthlj 
24 basis it is still by military allottment and if they do that 
25 once a month then I suppose it is satisfied? 
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MR. JACKMAN: Your Honor I wold submit that bimonthlj 
would mean every two months if she would rather go to that I 
am sure we can work the allottment out that way. 
THE COURT: I am sure it wasn't meant to mean that. 
MR. FITT: I am sure that the intended meaning - -
MR. JACKMAN: Well I understand that you know 
if you live by the sword you die by the sword and if you wantj 
to get technical and go by what it says that is what 
it says and I think the allottment is once a month and that 
is what she wants and that is how they take it. 
In a sense we pay it semimonthly, it is deducted 
from his check semimonthly. 
THE COURT: He doesn't get to enjoy it? 
MR. JACKMAN: Right. 
THE COURT: It is taken from him and he doesn't 
have the cash to enjoy for that extra two weeks. 
MR. FITT: Well in essence then he would be able 
to start his allottment three months late and we get 
everything three months behind time. 
THE COURT: In essence he hasn't done anything 
except starting the allottment right now that pays it I 
don't know how much late it is , it comes what within 
three or four, five days after the end of the month? 
THE WITNESS: It is automatically deposited on the 
30th of each month, on the 30th or 31st. 
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MR. JACKMAN: It is a electronic deposit that goes 
into her account. 
THE COURT: Deposit it at the end of each month 
Mr. Fitt. 
MR. JACKMAN: You are done Mr. Fitt? 
MR. FITT: Yes. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JACKMAN: 
Q Mam last year's Christmas vacation was split wasn't 
it? 
A Yes he picked up well he picked up the children on 
Christmas Day and had them for the 31st yes. 
Q So approximately six days Christmas Day being the 25ttj 
through the 31st about six days? 
A * Seven days. 
Q All right and the first half of that Christmas 
vacation you had the children? 
A They were out of school I don't remember how many day^ 
before. 
Q Well but they were with you? 
A Yes. 
Q So it is not a fair statement to say that the 
implication was that he had the full Christmas Holidays 
last Christmas and that isn't correct it was split between 
you? 
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A He had the majority of it I think. 
Q Now did he have visitation within the Christmas 
before that when he was in Ohio? 
A Yes he chose not to exercise it and he didn't come. 
Q No mam , did he visit with the children? 
A No he did not. 
Q What about the year before that? 
A The year before that yes he did. 
Q All right were you living in Ohio at that time? 
A Yes. 
Q All right so it was easy to visit but he wasn't able t|o 
visit with them the year he lived in Ohio and they lived 
out here? 
A Not the first winter that we moved out no. 
Q Are you employed? 
A No I am not. 
Q Is your husband employed at this time? 
A Yes he is. 
Q Where does he work? 
A Currently works for 7-11 Corporation. 
Q How much money does he make? 
MR. FITT: Objection Your Honor it is irrelevant? 
THE COURT: I think it is very relevant when you 
come to the not with regard to support but it is very 
relevant when it comes to tax exemptions. 
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THE WITNESS: Since he jsut started the job he is 
currently making $100.00 a week that is before taxes. 
BY MR. JACKMAN: 
Q So then of the family income per month on a monthly 
basis you received $400.00 a month from your husband's 
employment and $481.00 from Mr. Tross? 
A Up until this last month I received we received it wa^ 
a little over $1,000.00 a month from my husband's employment 
He has just recently been unemployed and his working 
this job part time until he gets something else. 
THE COURT: Is that a thousand take home? 
THE WITNESS: That is a thousand take home. 
BY MR. JACKMAN: 
Q Now I need to ask you a few questions about this 
calculation you did with regard to the monthly expenses 
and I am particularly interested with, you know you divided 
everything up I mean you are implying that you took 5/8's 
of the living room and you took 5/8fs of the kitchen, you 
took 5/8's of the laundry, 5/8's of the garage and all 
of that that is the implication that you have . Do the 
children share bedrooms? 
A I took 5/8's of the total cost of paying the house 
payments yes. 
Q But do your children, for example, take up 5/8's of 
the total square footage or do they share a bedroom, how 
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1 many bedrooms are in your house? 
2 A We have five bedrooms. 
3 Q All right and those are occupied all by people 
4 or used as a study or a den? 
5 A No. 
6 Q All right do each of your five children by Mr. Tr 
7 have their own room? 
8 1 A No not with only five bedrooms they take up three 
9 of the bedrooms. 
10 Q So to go around and say that they really take up 
11 3/5?s not 5/8fs so the numbers are a little bit allusory 
12 I isnf t i t ? 
13 A No I don't think so. 
14 Q Let me ask you about the furniture then you said 
15 amortized the cost of the furniture taken 5/8fs of the 
16 couches, 5/8fs are you buying any couches or dining 
17 room sets on time? 
18 A The only furniture I have bought in the last thre 
19 years have been three dressers for the five children . 
20 have bought two bunk beds sets which is four beds a piec 
21 Q These are just for your children? 
22 A Just for the children that is the only furniture 
23 I have bought in the last three years and most of that 
24 has been purchased in the last year except for one dress 
25 Q And that is what you have allocated when you say 
these installment payments on furniture that you are charging 
5/8's of? 
A Yes. 
Q All right does this furniture belong to the children 
when they turn 18 they can take their beds and go? 
A It is theirs. 
Q I see. That is all I have. 
THE COURT: Anything further Mr. Fitt? 
MR. FITT: Nothing further Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, you may step down. 
MR. FITT: I have nothing further. 
THE COURT: You may proceed Mr. Jackman. 
MR. JACKMAN: We would call Mr. Tross. 
THE COURT: Mr. Tross come forward and be 
administered an oath and take the witness stand. 
WILLIAM TROSS 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the defendant 
being first duly sworn was examined and testified as 
follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JACKMAN: 
Q Please state your name? 
A William Paul Tross. 
Q And you are the defendant I guess in this particular 
matter is that correct? 
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A That is correct, 
Q I first want to ask you a few questions with regard 
to what you heard your wife's testimony didn't you with 
regard to , two years ago why didn't you visit the children 
at Christmas? 
A Well it was a three day journey out to Utah and 
a three day journey back and that used up most of the 
Christmas visit just in traveling. 
Q You are only entitled to six days? 
A That is right. It wasn't practical at all only the 
summer visitation that made sense. 
Q You desire to visit with them that one time? 
A Yes I missed them a lot. 
Q And is it your desire that you have the visitation 
that is coming up? 
A Yes. 
Q And when was the last time you had any extended 
visitation with your children? 
A The summer. 
Q All right and so you feel that if you could have the 
first Christmas it could make up for the holidays etc., 
that you have missed? 
A Yes. 
Q Now - -
THE COURT: How old are these children? 
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THE WITNESS: The oldest is 12, one is 11, 9,8 and 
6. 
BY MR. JACKMAN: 
Q You have heard the allegation that you are behind in 
the mortgage payment would you explain to the court how many 
payments you are behind? 
A Well three but I guess counting November would be 4. 
Q All right and that you started to go behind 
approximately in June of this year? 
A No August. 
Q All right you are right. All right why did you stop 
making the payments? 
A Well we had tenants in there who left without 
notice. I talked to the bank about my problem and they 
said that they would consider a deed in lieu but in order 
to qualify for a deed in lieu I had to be behind in my 
payments and so they said that to stop making the payments. 
Q So you did that? 
A Yes. 
Q Are you now considering a deed in lieu? 
A Yes they are. 
Q Are they encouraging that they are going to do it? 
A Yes the bank is and the V.A. has to get into it and 
they have to approve it and the bank and the V.A. are working) 
together and they said that the V.A. is very slow at this. 
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1 Q All right now if they take a deed in lieu will there 
2 be any deficiency? 
3 A No. 
4 Q Okay. 
5 A The bank will be paid off. 
6 Q So you are just simply waiting for that to happen? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q Now with regard to the Christmas vacation you are 
9 agreeable to having it start one day after the school ends 
JO and have them back one day before the school begins? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q And this would be because for example if December 
13 31st occurred on a Wednesday there would be a number of four! 
14 days say in vacation before the children had to be back? 
15 A Right. 
16 Q So that is your desire then? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q To have them back, take them day after so they would 
19 have time to get ready and to bring them back at least the 
20 day before so they would have time to unwind? 
21 A Right. 
22 Q We had an objection on the church ordinances do you 
23 want me to address that I don't think Mr. Fitt covered that. 
24 THE COURT: No he didn't cover that. 
25 MR. JACKMAN: All right. 
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MR. FITT: I accepted what the court said in chamber] 
on the subject and I felt it wasn't worth going into. 
THE COURT: Well that is good reasoning. 
BY MR. JACKMAN: 
Q Now do you have any problems with the health 
insurance or the previous order of the court with regard 
to extraordinary expenses? 
A Yes I was getting bills for routine illnesses like 
an ear infection and doctor's visit of $20.00 and medication 
for $8.95 in essence I was getting every single medical bill 
that the kids had. 
Q And was it your request that you would like to have 
some help from the court as to what is an extraordinary 
expense would be? 
A 'Yes. 
Q And is it also your request that if health insurance 
is available to Mrs. Bartlett at no cost to her that 
the children could be carried on that as well? 
A Yes. 
Q In other words try and work it out so whatever the 
best possible package for all concerned could be provided? 
A That is right the insurance that covers the children 
let's use it. 
Q Mr. Tross you have retained me to be your attorney 
is that correct? 
n'i>r% 
A That is correct, 
Q And what was our agreement with regard to attorney 
fees? 
A Well that I would pay you $90.00 an hour. 
Q That is all Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may cross examine. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. FITT: 
Q The prior visitation that Christmas visitation that 
you missed you elected not to come because of the time 
constraints then? 
A The time yes. 
Q Airlines can get you out the same day? 
A At a great expense. 
Q But still can get you out that same day? 
A Sure. 
Q And there is some expense to driving anyway is there 
not? 
A That is correct. 
Q Where do you stay when you come here to Utah to 
visit the children? 
A I don't visit the children here for the extended peric) 
of time if I am in for a day I have a friend in Sandy, Utah 
that I stay with. 
Q When did you contact the finance department in order 
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to execute this existing allottment? 
A The end of July beginning of August, 
Q How long does it take for them end of July the 
beginning of August? 
A Right. 
Q When did you return the children? 
A In the middle of August. 
Q So you actually instituted the agreement before they 
returned them then? 
A I think I probably took care of it right after I 
got back I actually had a couple of weeks until September 
the 1st. 
Q Now you are hopeful that this deed in lieu will take 
place is that correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q What happens if it doesn't? 
A Well then I guess the bank will foreclose. 
Q And what about the deficiency? 
A I don't know that much about it I guess there will 
be one. 
Q Now you are in agreement if there is a deficiency 
and Mrs. Bartlett is unable to pay it then she is going to 
lose her V.A. benefits as far as home loans are concerned? 
MR. JACKMAN: I object I think that calls for a 
legal conclusion how he would know that. I don't know that 
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THE COURT: Do you know that? 
MR. JACKMAN: I don't know whether that is a fact or: 
not I mean if he knows I guess he can answer but I think 
that calls for a legal conclusion. 
THE COURT: Tf he knows I guess he can answer. 
Well I suppose more than a legal conclusion it calls for 
policy conclusion whatever their policy is with regard 
to that if he knows the policy? 
MR. JACKMAN: Well I think it also goes to the 
circumstances around the deficiency and how it was incurred 
and there is a lot to it. 
THE COURT: There again maybe so I don't know but 
if he knows the policy I will let him testify, he probably 
doesn't know. 
THE WITNESS: I don't know the policy Your Honor. 
BY MR. FITT: 
Q Did you have a piece of real property in Arizona or 
some place else? 
A I had at one time. 
Q And did your V.A. Loan 20 for buying it? 
A My V.A. entitlement ves it did. 
Q Your V.A. Entitlement did? 
A Yes a portion of it. 
Q Is it your V.A. entitlement still tied up with that? 
A A portion of them are yes because the loan is still 
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under I guess the original person that I sold it to and 
they haven't paid their loan off yet and they still have 
got 10 years to go. 
Q So when you bought the house in Ohio you didn't have 
any V.A. entitlements to buy it in your own name then is 
that right? 
A I didn't have enough correct. 
Q Okay at least you do understand that there are 
limitations on your ability to exercise the V.A. entitlement 
depending on what you have got committed already? 
A Right. 
Q You don't know whether or not the deficiency judgment 
or the deficiency against her would deprive her of any 
further V.A. entitlement do you? 
A I don't know for a fact no. 
Q Would you be willing to return the children two days 
beofre they return to school on the Christmas holidays? 
A No I think one day is fine. 
Q So you are not willing to return them two days? 
A No. 
Q Ahead of time? 
A No only every other year. 
Q Well the question of unwinding. No further questions 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything further Mr. Jackman? 
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MR. JACKMAN: I just want to make sure that I haven 
missed anything it is just kind of jumbled up. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JACKMAN: 
Q Mr. Tross it is your desire to take the children 
for income tax deductions purposes isn't it? 
A Yes that is correct. 
Q Since this is a pre 1984 Decree it is your request 
that the court order compliance with that if you are 
awarded some of the deductions is that correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q I also need to inquire of you with regard to the 
you heard some testimony regarding telephone calls and 
the visitation and etc., you want you are agreeable to this 
mutual restraining order not to harass each other etc? 
A Yes. 
Q And in the other respects that we have talked about ycju 
are in agreement with the recommendations by the Commissioner] 
and would ask the court to , you understand them and to 
implement them? 
A Yes. 
Q Even to the extent that some of them are not exactly 
what you wanted to begin with? 
A That is correct. 
Q You are not making this appeal? 
48 
A No. 
Q Thank you that is all? 
THE COURT: Anything further Mr. Fitt? 
MR. FITT: Yes. 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. FITT: 
Q What is your income annually? 
A It is approximately $38,000.00 a year. 
Q Is that total entitlements? 
A Yes. 
Q That takes into consideration basic allowance for 
quarters and basic allowance for rations that you are not 
taxed? 
A That is correct. 
Q * You don't receive any incentive pay, flight pay, 
or any hazardous duty pay of any kind? 
A No. 
Q What does that leave you on a monthly basis after 
taxes? 
MR. JACKMAN: I will object to that Your Honor 
that would go to the question of child support or alimony 
or something like that the gross income is relevant for 
income tax deductions purposes but irrelevant for anything 
else that is before the court? 
THE COURT: What are you claiming for this? 
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MR. FITT: Well it is our position that $90.00 
approximately per month per child is really a small 
amount for a person who is earning $38,000.00 and can afford 
to pass up if that is the only issue the income deductions 
on that. 
THE COURT: Well you heard my feelings about that ar) 
that is that I am concerned about creating the largest streair) 
of cash flow for the benefit of the children and I donft see 
any reason to forego anything if we can avoid it and 
pay the government. I realize you get your money from the 
government but I think they have got their hand in their 
pocket as deep as I would like to see it. I don't see 
any reason to make an order that would allow them to stick 
it in there any deeper. 
Right now there is no question , I mean there is only 
$430.00 gross going into your client's household. She is 
not employed and her husband is making about $430.00 a month 
and I expect that will go up. 
MR. FITT: We are dealing with what happened over thje 
entire year however Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well even A $1,000.00 a month 
his take home pay was $1,000.00 a month her testimony is 
that it costs a $1,000.00 a month to keep the kids. I don't 
know how they keep the other three if that is all there is. 
I am applying the rule of reason now. 
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1 MR. FITT: I can't be a witness they are my 
2 neighbors and I know they are not extravagant. 
3 THE COURT: Well I am not saying that they are 
4 extravagant all I am saying is that the testimony 
c before this court is that it costs a $1,000.00 a month 
g to keep five children and yet the testimony is that 
7 before he was laid off and was bringing money home it was onl 
a $1,000.00 a month. Now simple mathematics tell you that 
can't possibly be because a $1,000.00 a month is 
obviously taking care of 8 people and not 5. 
My order with regard to taxes is not going to be set 
in concrete however. 







j4 I THE COURT: Because conditions may change which 
15 may 
jg MR. JACKMAN: Something inbetween maybe appropriate 
17 down the line? 
THE COURT: I think so. 
MR. FITT: Your Honor I have no further cross 
20 I examination and my client would have - -
2i I THE COURT: You may step down 
MR. FITT: I wasn't aware of this and she would 
testify and if the court wants to hear that , that she 






25 $500 .00 a month and has for t h e p a s t few y e a r s w h i l e she ha 
been going to school. 
THE COURT: Does she pay that on her books and 
tuition? 
MRS. MARY BARTLETT: Over and above what they pay fcj 
books and tuition that was after books and tuition. 
MR. FITT: Basically living money. 
THE COURT: Is that scholarship or V.A.? 
MRS. MARY BARTLETT: Scholarship I have not been 
entilted to V.A. 
MR. FITT: That would be it Your Honor. 
MR. JACKMAN: Is that taxable? 
MRS. MARY BARTLETT: No. The extra $500.00 
per month that I receive was supposed to be used towards 
paying my houshold expenses while I was in school and that 
is what is was used for and as long as it was being used 
for household expenses and I could show them by my records 
that is what it was used for it was not taxable. 
THE COURT: Brings us back to about the same 
position with the same gross being taxes. 
MR. JACKMAN: I would ask to be sworn with regard 
to attorney fees and may I testify from here? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
RICK JACKMAN 
first being duly sworn testified regarding attorney fees. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
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MR. JACKMAN: Your Honor I have prepared an 
affidavit with regard to attorney fees and I have extracted 
from my time records by date and amount that we bill I didn't 
put down the hours but the hours is divided by 92 and 
would come out with tenths and so we bill in money not in 
time and I have prepared attorney fees and they come to a 
total of $1,420,50. 
I would also testify that we cost $30.00 for the 
counter petition in this matter as a filing fee and then 
we had reporter's fee of $146.40 which would be the 
cost in this matter. 
With regard to the matter I would testify that the case 
itself has been a little more difficult because of the 
initial antagonism between the parties we had to take her 
deposiiton we responded to a set of interrogatories . We 
reviewed interrogatories that she sent to the real estate 
agent with regard to those issues. 
We also prepared for the pretrial hearing and I think 
we were successful at the pretrial hearing both in defending 
against the allegations in the petition and substantiating 
our allegations in the counter petition. 
We have also had to prepare the order in that case for 
the recommendations. We responded to the objection 
that was filed in the recommendation and again it was found 
in our favor. Again that was objected to and responded 
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again and so the case has been a little bit extensive in 
attorney fees. 
I have felt and would submit to the court my affidavit 
and my bill of costs. 
MR. FITT: You say that the costs maybe increased 
because of the antagonism between the parties? 
MR. JACKMAN: Well we just felt that initially 
that the deposition is expensive we charged $145.00 
for the deposition and $145.00 for the reporter's fee and 
we felt that it would be impossible to obtain the information) 
that we needed by way of written interrogatories and that 
was based on a previous conversation that I had with Mrs. 
Bartlett wherein her husband got on the line and it was the 
allegations that my client had made to me with regard to 
her being uncooperative were true. So we felt that a deposition 
was the way to do it which was a little more expensive than 
normally do in this kind of a case. 
MR. FITT: But there is an antagonism between 
the parties? 
MR. JACKMAN: I would dare say that they are not 
in love anymore. 
MR. FITT: No further questions, Your Honor and I 
would like to call Mrs. Bartlett for the purpose of 
rebuttal on that Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. 
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MARY BARTLETT 
called as a rebuttal witness by and on behalf of the 
plaintiff being previously sworn was examined and testified 
as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR, FITT: 
Q Mr. Jackman made reference to the fact that there 
is antagonism between you and Mr. Tross, how do the 
telephone calls with Mr. Tross usually go what is the usual 
tenor of those calls? 
A Most of the time when we have talked on the phone - -
MR. JACKMAN: I object Your Honor I don't see 
most of the time, foundation name a specific time, place. 
I don't remember dates. 
I can't respond to most of the time. 





THE COURT: Little broad but I am going to allow her] 
to testify, go ahead. 
THE WITNESS: Even for many years before we ever 
got divorced telephone calls generally resulted in there 
is no other way to put it except a lot of yelling and 
screaming and name calling and in most cases I began quite 
a few years ago to hang up on him when he would start yellind 
because I knew that once he started yelling it was impossible 
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to talk to him I would hang up. 
Q Has that continued since the divorce? 
A Yes sir. 
Q Now the telephone call that you received from Mr. 
Jackman would you tell the court what you how that conversation 
went what you can recall? 
A Once he had identified himself he immediately started 
to threaten me with legal action if I did not allow Mr. Tros^ 
to come and pick up the children the next day. I tried 
for a quite a period of time to get through his yelling 
and his accusations to tell him that there was going to be 
no problem with Mr. Tross picking up the children on the 
next day as scheduled in the Decree even though we felt 
due to a prior agreement that he should pick them up the 
morning of the 26th but when we were finally able I lost 
my temper I got tired of getting yelled at and I hang up the 
phone. 
Q Were you yelled at by Mr. Jackman? 
A Yes and I had hung up the phone and I found out later 
that my husband had picked up the phone about the same time 
I had hung it up and after 15 minutes of trying to get 
Mr. Jackman to quit yelling at him he finally got it through 
his head that there was not going to be any problem we didn! 
anticipate any problem but it took him that long to calm 
him down. 
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Q And you did go to the deposition is that right? 
A Yes I did. 
Q How would you say that you were treated by Mr. Jackmarj 
during that deposition? 
A He was rude and obnoxious. 
Q Okay. 
A He spent most of the time arguing with me because 
he didn't like the answers I was giving. 
Q No further questions. 
THE COURT: Any cross exmination? 
MR. JACKMAN: Yes. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JACKMAN: 
Q Mrs. Bartlett my understanding was is that you were 
going 'to deny Mr. Tross one day of visitation because 
he kept the kids one day too late on the prior visitation 
is that correct? 
A No that had nothing to do with it. 
Q That is what you told me isn't it? 
A No it is not. 
Q I have no further questions. 
MR. FITT: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
MR. JACKMAN: Your Honor I don't know that it 
matters that much but the reason for the phone call was that 
3 / 
my client reported to me that she was going to have him 
come to show up a day late becuase he had the kids one 
extra day in the visitation before. I would also submit 
that there were no threats other than the fact that I simply 
stated if she did not cooperate with the terms of the 
Decree we would take whatever legal action would be 
appropriate. That is all I have other than , that is all 
we have. 
MR. FITT: Really with the sole exception of the issjue 
regarding the income tax deductions we wouldn't be in court 
except for Mr. Tross's conduct toward Mrs. Bartlett. She has) 
been oppressed by him for many years and she just doesn't 
want to put up with anymore. She wants her children to 
visit their father and she wants to get on with her life 
she doesn't want to have this kind of thing continue and 
then she doesn't want to be yelled at by him or by his 
lawyer or by anybody else . 
I attended the deposition and I have a lot of respect 
for Rick Jackman but this is the rudest deposition that 
I have ever particiapted in and I on several occasions I toldj 
him I was going to close it and ask that it be brought 
into court rather than have him persist in arguing with 
her and yelling at her. So there are feelings but I think 
in this case Mrs. Bartlett is the victim of the hard feelings! 
and she is attempting to assert her own for her own protection. 
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MR. JACKMAN: The court has heard our argument 
and you know where we are at. I don't want to rehash 
it and I don't want to go through it. The only thing 
is that I would make this suggestion I think Mr. Tross 
is entitled to some attorney fees. However I appreciate 
the economic situation that the parties find themselves 
in and if we got a judgment for attorney fees I feel it 
would be moot in terms of its collectibility. 
However with regard to the visitation I think we have 
heard what the court has said and heard the evidence and 
I think if I could fair it out at all it seemed to be weeding 
its way out. 
I would suggest however, that perhaps and we even have 
gone so for to even agree to the arrearage this other 
$600.00 per month, the $119.00 per month as of some 
$300.00 or $400.00. 
I would make this suggestion to the court that perhaps 
that would be an appropriate way to offset that against 
some of Mr. Tross's attorney fees and his costs. The fact 
of the matter is in this case is that when it went to 
Commission Maetani the petition was not affirmed the 
counterclaim was. Then was objected to and proffers were 
made and supplemental arguments were made pretty much the 
recommendation was adhered to and we would submit that 
I think the court today I hope is going to rule in a way that 
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1 is going to be favorable to the questions that Mr. Tross 
2 has been presenting. He hasnTt made unreasonable demands. 
3 I am sorry that she doesn't like me and that I am rude 
4 and obnoxious but that is her opinion. He is entitled 
5 to some sort of a break attorney fees is really the issue 
6 that bothers me he has had to travel up here several times 
7 and I think it would be a good time to offset some of this 
8 stuff she is talking about but I think the rest of it 
9 is pretty clear. 
10 MR. FITT: Again the difficulty is that and I 
H feel it is more his fault because of the problems 
12 and a lot of these problems could have been resolved if 
13 he had been in a mood to talk and listen rather than argue 
14 and if Mr. Jackman is able to garnish the child support 
15 to get' his attorney fees if the court choses to award them 
16 then the court I think is entitled to offset but this 
17 money that is owed is the children1t money and not Mrs. 
18 Bartletts. 
19 MR. JACKMAN: Then give me a judgment I am trying 
20 to be fair. 
21 THE COURT: Okay making reference to Commissioner's 
22 Maetani's supplemental order apparently there is no problem 
23 with paragraph one and two. Paragraph three I am going 
24 to leave that the same and if Mr. Tross can avail himself 
25 with the cooperation of Mrs. Bartlett to give a deed in lieu 
W 
that is the thing to do otherwise I am leaving it then you 
might just simply add to that both parties shall 
reasonably pursue the deed in lieu of foreclosure to avoid 
any deficiency otherwise it can stay the same. 
With regard to Christmas vacation was that changed 
later. Paragraph five? 
MR. JACKMAN: Paragraph four. 
THE COURT: Well yes paragraph four. 
MR. JACKMAN: No I think that is 5:00 P.M. on the 
day the vacations begins that would be the day. 
THE COURT: I am going to modify that and he can 
pick them up one day after they are out of school return them 
one day prior that would be 24 hours. So when they are 
out of school 24 hours he can pick them up and can return t\\ 
24 hours prior to when they go back to school whether that 
is the 31st or whatever day that might be. It might be 
that the first comes on a Friday and then you will have the 
second and the third and so will be entitled to keep them 
over to that point, 24 hours prior. 
I am going to award the 1987 Christmas visit to the 
plaintiff. 
MR. JACKMAN: That is to Mrs. Bartlett? 
THE COURT: Mrs. Bartlett. Have you got any 
quarrels about the summer vacation? We pretty well resolvecj 
that number elevent didn't we that will remain the same. 
em 
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With regard to paragraph five Mr. Fit you have 
informed your client I think that it is this court's opinion! 
that the father who is worthy should have the first 
opportunity to confer upon his children the church 
ordinances and that doesn't mean they have to wait around 
an inordinate length of time anything of that sort when 
that time comes if he can afford himself of that opportunity 
of course if the children are willing I don't want to have 
an unwilling child but he should have that first opportunity. 
MR. FITT: The language of five should be modified 
some what really quite fixed in concrete the way it is. 
THE COURT: Well yes I think we can modify that and 
say that the first opportunity because I don't you know 
if he is out of the country or some other place and 
the child turns 12 and is to receive the Priesthood 
I would hesitate to have that child to wait two or three or 
four months to do that even though that might be a nice 
thing for the father to do it it kind of puts the child out 
in a situation where he is not on equal grounds with his 
peers it is a bit of a problem. 
MR. JACKMAN: Add that language then William P. 
Tross shall be entitled the opportunity to perform. 
THE COURT: I think that would be satisfactory. 
You can expend upon Paragraph six with regard to an 
additional restraining language restraining that and it shoull 
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be mutual. 
Paragraph seven in this case I am going to have the 
defendant provide the hospita1ization and dental insurance 
however, if the plaintiff becomes employed and there is 
a medical insurance available through her employment without 
additional expense to her she will add the children to that 
medical insurance policy and you may add that language. 
MR. JACKMAN: What about uncovered expenses. 
The original Decree talks about extraordinary expenses. 
THE COURT: Well I don't know what the 
government has but I think they cover all extraordinary 
expenses don't they? 
MR. JACKMAN: That is basically our point they 
don't cover things like ear drops for example and we 
wnat to avoid the situation where well if it is going to be 
covered we will have to go to the Emergency Room as opposed 
to the family doctor. 
THE COURT: You are talking about extraordinary 
I thought you meant something that is going to be very 
expensive? 
MR. JACKMAN: That is what we think it means but 
the problem that we have that is not the way it has been 
operating when he would get, he talked about a bill , 
talked about getting a bill for ear drops obviously that 
is not extraordinary. When we get a $20.00 bill in the mail 
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that is not an extraordinary expense. 
THE COURT: Well those items which are not 
covered by insurance and the parties should split that 
amount. 
MR. JACKMAN: That will be a cap on it. Maybe 
we ought to add that language if she could get them 
to a military olace for braces or something it is 
worth the trip to Hill Air Force to cover a major expense 
like that. 
THE COURT: You may have the language there as to 
that. 
I am going to award the income tax deductions to the 
defendant for 1987 and unless and that is provided that 
he is current with his child support. If he is current 
for his child support in 1988 I am going to award 
him the tax exemptions for 1988 because the plaintiff will 
not graduate until April of 1988. Her husband is in the 
process of lifting himself up in a new position so it 
appears that through 1988 certainly the plaintiff will be 
or rather the defendant,wil1 be putting out the bulk 
of the money. 
Following the year 1988 I don't have a formula but 
following the year 1988 I think the parties should be ordered 
to cooperate with regard to tax exemptions and possibly 
split tax exemptions so that the plaintiff has some and the 
64 
defendant has some based some what on the ratio of the 
total incomes that are coming into both households and the 
total parties that are being supported by those incomes 
and that is going to require a little cooperation but I thin^ 
it is well worth it to sit down and think about it when 
you do it. You may also add the language to the extent 
that the cooperation creates the greatest cash flow 
to the two families for the purpose of rearing the children. 
I am going to leave the military allottment as it is 
she gets it at the end of the month instead of the first 
of the month. It is electronically placed into her 
bank account on the 30th or the 31st so it is not a full 
month late. It is just a couple of weeks late part of 
it and I am going to leave that as it is. 
Under the circumstances specifically Mr. Jackman with 
your position of attorney fees however, realistically it 
would be a big burden to lay them on the plaintiff at 
this time I am going to have each party pay their own 
attorney fees. 
MR. JACKMAN: Number eleven is okay that is the threje 
week visitation? 
THE COURT: Yes I think we indicated that was okay. 
MR. FITT: Three times? 
THE COURT: Three times upon giving notice. 
MR. FITT: There ought to be an added provision in 
6 D 
there if Mrs. Bartlett has plans or something that she 
notify Captain Tross so that she would be aware in advance. 
THE COURT: If she has something planned which 
has some family implications such as I mentioned family 
reunions, a family vacation that she is aware of and it 
is planned in advance she should communicate that to Mr. 
Tross so that he is aware of and that those times would 
be automatically eliminated. I am not saying that they 
ought to be a lot of them and they maybe one a year or 
something like that she might have planned and if she can 
let him know several weeks or months in advance that is what 
I would like to see done so that he knows that is going 
to happen and not get into a big argument when she has 
planned it for three months but hasn't communicated it to 
him and he happens to come up and they clash just as sure 
as we are sitting here that is exactly what will happen. 
MR. JACKMAN: I want to make sure that I understand 
what about the "arrearage'1 the $119.00 for the two months 
and the $80.00? 
THE COURT: Whatever arrearage is Mr. Tross you 
pay that current, didn't you agree to do that. 
MR. JACKMAN: We suggested than and also suggest thajt 
be offset against the attorney fees since he has incurred 
quite an expense and it is money out of his pocket and he has! 
had to come up three times and that is only $300.00? 
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THE COURT: To that extent I will allow the 
offset. 
MR. FITT: Your Honor that money belongs to the 
children not to Mrs. Bartlett and if Mr. Jackman were to 
obtain any kind of a judgment for attorney fees he could 
not garnish - -
THE COURT: I am not going to allow it as a judgment] 
I am going to allow it as an offset. I know what you are 
saying, however, I think you are going to soon see a situaticj 
where if the mother is a custodial parent and visitation is 
not allowed you are going to see the right to offset that 
with support money that is on its way. 
MR. FITT: Sh'e is not denying visitation Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I know but I am just saying that is the 
same philosophy that is still the chidlren's money, current 
philosophy is that is the kid's money you can't use 
visitation as a right to offset that what I am saying. 
MR. FITT: I still feel that Captain Tross is 
as much responsible for the hard feelings in fact more 
so than causes us to be here rather than be able to 
reach a settlement on this thing. 
MR. JACKMAN: With the court's permission could 
I simply state in the order that the reduced allottment 
is to begin as of August of 1987 and then there will be 
no arrearage. 
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THE COURT: What about that Mr. Fitt. 
MR. FITT: Captain Tross gets his cake and gets 
to eat it to Your Honor and I really feel that it is unfair 
as far as the children are concerned and heavens know 
they need the money now. 
THE COURT: Yes I understand. 
MR. JACKMAN: Well Judge we are back to square 
one if they hadn?t objected twice and come here today 
there would have been money available. 
MR. FITT: And we wouldn't still be getting 
$377.00 unless we brought him back to the court on it Your 
Honor, we are still stuck between a rock and a hard place. 
If there had been no objection then we wouldn't be, he 
would have arbitrarily decided to make it to make a change 
and then still have planned. 
MR. JACKMAN: That is not true she brought the 
complaint she lost at the Commissioner's level and she lost 
on the reconsideration and I think we have spent three and 
a half hours here plus another two hours preparing 
for this and he just doesn't have the money to be honest 
with you to make up the back arrearage with the expenses 
of coming up here and you know he has used up most of his 
visitation now fighting in court. It is fair. 
THE COURT: I think in view of the circumstances 
where this is the third time in court and it seems some of 
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these things could ahve been worked out to shorten the 
time let my order remain as I have made it. Anything 
further. 
MR. FITT: Nothing your Honor. 
MR. JACKMAN: Who would you like to prepare it? 
THE COURT: You prepare it give it to Mr. Fitt under) 
Rule 2.9 for his approval. 
MR. JACKMAN: Thank you. 
THE COURT: And then submit it to the court. 
MR. FITT: Thank you. 
THE COURT: If nothing further court will be 
in recess. 
THE BAILIFF: Please arise court will be in recess. 
(WHEREUPON, this matter was concluded) 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
vSTATE OF UTAH ) 
• ss 
BOUNTY OF WASATCH ) 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the HEARING was reported 
l>y me in Stenotype, and thereafter caused by me to be 
transcribed into typewriting by Richard C. Tatton and that 
*\ full, true and correct transcription of said HEARING 
Was so taken, 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not of kin or otherwise 
Associated with any of the parties to said cause of action 
'irid that I am not interested in the event thereof. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal at Midway, Utah, 
'his / f * day of January, 1988. 
RICHARD C. TATTON, CSR 
My commission expires: 
June 15, 1989 
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